Policing as Administration by Slobogin, Christopher
 
(91) 
ARTICLE 
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CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN† 
Police agencies should be governed by the same administrative principles that 
govern other agencies. This simple precept would have significant implications for 
regulation of police work, in particular the type of suspicionless, group searches and 
seizures that have been the subject of the Supreme Court’s special needs jurisprudence 
(practices that this Article calls “panvasive”). Under administrative law principles, 
when police agencies create statute-like policies that are aimed at largely innocent 
categories of actors—as they do when administering roadblocks, inspection regimes, 
drug testing programs, DNA sampling programs, and data collection—they should 
have to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or a similar democratically 
oriented process and avoid arbitrary and capricious rules. Courts would have the 
authority to ensure that policies governing panvasive actions are authorized by statute 
and implemented evenhandedly, both in individual instances and as they are 
distributed within the agency’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, these principles would apply 
regardless of whether the panvasive practice has been designated a search or seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement agencies can be 
divided into two types: “suspicion-based” and “panvasive.”1 Most police efforts 
to detect and deter crime involve a decision about whether to seize a particular 
person or search his or her possessions, based on “probable cause” or “reasonable 
suspicion.”2 The officer in the field determines whether the confrontation takes 
place, the unit of investigation is usually no more than a few individuals, and 
the motivation behind the police action is suspicion of crime. 
 
1 See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for 
Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 286 (2016) (“When policing agencies police, they do one of 
two things: (1) they investigate, and (2) they seek, in a programmatic or regulatory way, to curb a 
social problem.”). 
2 See DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 16, 25-26 (1994) (noting that most 
policing involves either “patrol” or detective work and stating that both are “overwhelmingly 
reactive”). I include in this category suspicionless actions incident to arrest, stop, or search because 
they immediately follow suspicion-based actions. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
224 (1973) (discussing the officer’s ability to search an arrestee or his vicinity simply by virtue of the 
person having been placed under arrest). 
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Panvasive searches and seizures, which have also been called dragnets3 and 
programmatic searches and seizures,4 are something quite different.5 These 
police actions usually share three characteristics: (1) they occur pursuant to a 
legislative or executive branch policy, written or unwritten, that officers are 
directed to follow; (2) they seek to ferret out or deter undetected wrongdoing, 
usually within a designated group, rather than focus on a particular crime known 
to have already occurred; and, relatedly, (3) they are purposefully suspicionless 
with respect to any particular individual, and thus will almost inevitably affect 
a significant number of people not involved in wrongdoing.6 Examples of 
panvasive actions include residential and business inspection programs, 
checkpoints (aimed at detecting, inter alia, illegal immigration, drunken 
drivers, or drivers without licenses), drug testing programs, creation of DNA 
databases, collection of communications metadata, and establishment of 
surveillance regimes involving cameras, tracking systems, and the like.7 
Although all of these investigative techniques involve searching for and 
seizing items or people, not all of these techniques (for instance, metadata 
collection and public camera surveillance) are considered searches or seizures 
 
3 I have used this term in previous work. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2010). However, for reasons indicated below at note 5, I have since 
used the panvasive nomenclature. 
4 See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1039, 1042 (2016) (distinguishing “programmatic surveillance” from “transactional” search-by-search 
analysis); see also Friedman & Stein, supra note 1, at 286. 
5 I use the word “panvasive” to describe these actions because they are pervasive, invasive, and 
affect large numbers of people, most of whom police know are innocent of wrongdoing. See 
Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, 82 MISS. L.J. 307, 308 (2013) (“Although 
these techniques are now pervasive, and are often invasive, their defining characteristic is their 
panvasiveness—the fact that they affect so many people, most of them innocent of any 
wrongdoing.”). The term “dragnet” is less apt because it has generally been applied solely to 
detentions in connection with solving a particular crime, and thus includes neither searches nor 
preventive actions. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728-29 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(referring to the detention of twenty-four black youths for fingerprinting purposes as a “dragnet 
procedure[]”). The word “programmatic” is also misleading, because suspicion-based searches and 
seizures can also be part of a program. See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the 
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 168-69 (2015) 
(describing New York City’s recently suspended stop-and-frisk policy, which ostensibly required 
reasonable suspicion before a stop could occur, as a “program”). 
6 Note, however, that panvasive searches and seizures could be based on data that suggest a 
particular type of location or activity is likely to be associated with the crime or crimes of interest 
and thus could sometimes be said to be based on what I have called “generalized suspicion.” 
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57 (1991); cf. 
Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 809, 846-50 (2011) (arguing that “hit rates,” predicted beforehand or obtained after a 
government action, can provide the “suspicion” needed to make a search or seizure reasonable). 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 24–96. 
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under the Fourth Amendment.8 When the courts do find that a particular 
investigation program is a search or a seizure, they usually conclude that the 
government interest in the program outweighs its intrusiveness, often using 
what has come to be called “special needs” analysis, on the theory that these 
situations are outside the typical bailiwick of the police.9 Thus, the Supreme 
Court has upheld, against Fourth Amendment challenge, suspicionless 
inspections of gun stores, liquor stores, mining operations, and junkyards, 
suspicionless stops at border and sobriety checkpoints, suspicionless drug 
testing of government officials, railway workers, and school children, and 
suspicionless DNA sampling of arrestees, and lower courts have upheld 
suspicionless operation of counterterrorist checkpoints, metadata programs, 
and camera surveillance systems.10 
These decisions have been controversial and are currently in a state of 
flux. Some scholars would impose the traditional suspicion-based warrant 
regime in many of these situations,11 or would preclude prosecutorial use of 
any evidence thereby obtained,12 whereas others agree with the Court’s 
 
8 The constitutional test is whether the police action (1) infringes reasonable expectations of 
privacy or (2) involves a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space. See United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012) (identifying the “reasonable expectation of privacy” and 
“common-law trespass” formulas as the tests for when the Fourth Amendment applies). The 
Supreme Court’s “third party” doctrine holds that a person has no expectation of privacy when he 
or she voluntarily surrenders information to a third party, whether it be a bank, phone company, or 
internet service provider. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“This Court has held 
repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to 
a third party . . . .”). The Supreme Court has also held that surveillance of public activities is not a 
search, so long as that surveillance is not prolonged. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 
(1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges 
on expectations of privacy.”). 
9 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“[W]e have upheld certain 
regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
10 See infra Sections I.A–F. 
11 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL THAN EVER: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 93-144 (2012) (disagreeing with most of the 
Court’s special needs cases); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating 
the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 522-23 (1991) (arguing that suspicionless searches 
should be permitted only in cases involving extreme exigency or presenting “the most minimal 
potential for abuse and unnecessary intrusion”); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth 
Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 25-32 (1994) (criticizing the suggestion 
that probable cause should not be required for all government intrusions, including surveillance). 
12 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 
DUKE L.J. 843, 920-21 (2010) (arguing that when government purports to be carrying out 
“regulatory” searches and seizures, as is the case with many special needs situations, it should be 
prohibited from using any evidence it garners in criminal prosecutions); see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, 
Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless 
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intuition that balancing is required, but would require a much weightier, 
“compelling” government interest before upholding a panvasive action.13 The 
Court itself has begun to backtrack from its early decisions narrowly 
construing the Fourth Amendment’s threshold.14 And just last Term, in City 
of Los Angeles v. Patel, the Court signaled that it may also rethink its highly 
deferential special needs jurisprudence.15 
The time for rethinking is at hand. But the template should be neither 
traditional Fourth Amendment law nor strict scrutiny analysis. In fact, 
constitutional law should largely be beside the point in this setting, 
functioning only as a backstop protection for fundamental liberties and as an 
exhortation that panvasive actions be reasonable. Instead, the concrete rules 
governing panvasive techniques should be viewed through the entirely 
different prism of administrative law. 
The reason administrative law should be the primary mechanism in this 
setting is simple: police departments are agencies, and as such should have to 
abide by the same constraints that govern other agencies. Although scholars 
from as long ago as the 1970s have recognized that administrative law can be 
a useful means of regulating the police,16 and a few scholars have recently 
rejuvenated this idea,17 none have provided a convincing rationale for why the 
administrative template is required in this setting or fleshed out in any detail 
how it might work. 
 
Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 781 (2007) (noting that “‘special needs’ searches are more easily 
tolerated if they do not result in criminal penalties”). 
13 See infra note 119. 
14 In United States v. Jones, five Justices signaled a willingness to hold that prolonged public 
tracking, whether or not accompanied by a trespass, is a search. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”); id. at 964 
(Alito, J., concurring) (writing on behalf of himself and three other Justices that “the use of longer 
term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy”); see 
also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1411 (2013) (holding that a dog sniff of a home from curtilage 
is a search). 
15 See 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452-53 (2015) (holding that, although special needs analysis applied, a 
hotel owner is entitled to have a neutral decisionmaker review a demand to search the hotel’s registry 
before he can be penalized for failing to comply). 
16 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
423 (1974) (“[I]nformed authorities today agree with rare unanimity upon the need to direct and 
confine police discretion by the same process of rulemaking that has worked excellently to hold 
various other forms of public agencies [accountable] under standards of lawfulness, fairness and 
efficiency.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal Control of the Police, 52 TEX. L. REV. 703, 725 
(1974) (“My central idea is that police practices should no longer be exempt from the kind of judicial 
review that is usual for other administrative agencies.”); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 
70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 690 (1972) (touting police department rulemaking because “direct discipline 
imposed by the police internally is far more likely to deter than remote exclusions of evidence in 
criminal trials”). 
17 See infra Section II.C. 
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The myopia on the part of most of the academy and the courts results in 
part from the understandable belief that the Fourth Amendment, as a 
practical matter, has preempted the field of police regulation. But it also 
derives from the fact that the usual starting point of analysis conceives of 
police work as a suspicion-based endeavor. An officer’s decision to stop, arrest, 
or search someone is typically thought of as an individualized assessment, and 
most Fourth Amendment cases have in fact involved just such a search or 
seizure. In administrative law parlance, the suspicion-based model of policing 
could be characterized as a form of “adjudication” by the officer on the street, 
and thus not amenable to the administrative regulatory mechanisms that 
focus on legislative-like “rulemaking.”18 In a suspicion-based regime, to the 
extent legislative pronouncements are relevant at all, the governing rules 
come from the criminal law; law enforcement officials who act based on 
suspicion are engaged in determining when a person may have violated a 
criminal statute. 
By contrast, when police instead carry out searches and seizures that are 
panvasive in nature, they are not adjudicating whether the people who are 
stopped or searched violated a criminal or regulatory prohibition enacted by 
the legislature. Rather, they are enforcing a rule, often adopted by the police 
themselves, that purposefully impedes perfectly innocent activity, such as 
driving on the roads, going to school, or relying on common carriers to 
communicate. Like Environmental Protection Agency rules requiring 
pollution-reduction regimens or Food and Drug Administration rules 
mandating certain types of food processing, panvasive actions by the police 
impose conditions on everyday, legitimate conduct of potentially huge numbers 
of people, enforced by coercive measures or avoidable only by changing that 
conduct. Because, as explained earlier, panvasive searches and seizures are 
policy-driven, group-based, and suspicionless, they are legislative in nature. 
They are carried out in aid of a generally applicable regime that, if 
promulgated by any other executive agency, would be considered a form of 
rule governed by administrative law principles. 
That conclusion has significant regulatory implications. For instance, it 
means that panvasive actions have to be legislatively authorized. It triggers 
notice-and-comment or analogous procedures that ensure public input into 
police rulemaking. And it occasions “hard look” judicial review19 of both the 
 
18 See 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:2, at 4 (2d ed. 1979) 
(“[R]ulemaking is the part of the administrative process that resembles a legislature’s enactment of 
a statute . . . and adjudication is the part of the administrative process that resembles a court’s 
decision of a case.”). 
19 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the “Hard Look” Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 151, 
154-59 (2006) (discussing the Administrative Procedure Act and associated case law establishing the 
hard look doctrine). 
2016] Policing as Administration 97 
substance of police agency regulations and the process by which they are 
created. While that review does not amount to strict scrutiny, it requires 
meeting more than the minimal rationality standard that the Supreme Court 
usually applies to panvasive searches and seizures.20 Furthermore, the hard 
look standard applies regardless of whether the government program is 
designated a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure.” 
A reorientation of panvasive search and seizure jurisprudence toward 
administrative law principles stakes out a middle position that many of those 
involved in the debate about panvasive actions might find palatable. Critics 
of the Court and of current ways of policing might welcome the greater 
emphasis on the rule of law, public input, and judicial rationality-with-bite 
review, as well as the fact that these constraints do not depend on the Court’s 
definition of the Fourth Amendment’s threshold. At the same time, a 
reframing of panvasive searches and seizures as administrative actions gives 
significant weight to legislative and executive decisionmaking, and it draws 
from the Court’s precedent, such as it is. 
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of the relevant case law on 
panvasive searches and seizures, with an emphasis on the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of inspections, checkpoints, drug testing programs, and DNA 
sampling, as well as lower court cases concerning surveillance. Part II points 
out the internal inconsistencies of the Court’s jurisprudence—in particular, 
the peculiar implications of its special needs analysis—and also critiques the 
most prominent alternatives suggested by commentators, the strict scrutiny 
model and the “new administrativist” model. Part III then argues, based in 
part on the premise that all public officials must be subject to administrative 
law, in part on widely ignored aspects of the Supreme Court’s inspection 
cases, and in part on the structure of panvasive search and seizure itself, that 
administrative law principles should be the primary means of curbing 
government discretion in this setting. Using examples from the surveillance 
and street policing contexts, Part IV fleshes out how these principles would 
apply: to be legitimate, panvasive actions would require authorizing legislation, 
policymaking procedures that involve community input, a written product 
with a written rationale, and strictures on implementation to ensure even 
application both across jurisdictions and within a particular application of the 
program. It also explains why these principles should apply even to local 
policing efforts that usually are thought to be exempt from federal and state 
administrative procedure statutes. If followed, these constraints would 
provide a robust regulatory structure even if the Fourth Amendment does not 
 
20 See id. at 156 (defining one principal element of the hard look standard as “the requirement 
that the agency’s ultimate policy choice be reasonable, not just minimally rational”). 
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apply to panvasive actions or applies only in the very deferential manner 
contemplated by special needs analysis. 
I. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court has decided over twenty cases involving panvasive 
searches and seizures as defined in this Article, the first in 1973 and the most 
recent in 2015. In most of these cases, the Court has employed a straightforward 
balancing analysis that weighs the government’s interests against the 
individual’s, and then has either upheld the program or modified it in only a 
minimal fashion. In a few cases, it has declared the program unconstitutional 
and imposed a suspicion-based regime instead. The dividing line usually 
depends on whether the Court views the situation as one involving “special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [that] make the warrant 
and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”21 This language first 
appeared in a 1985 case (ironically, one that did not involve a panvasive search 
or seizure22), but the Court has since used it in referring to pre-1985 panvasive 
cases as well.23 
The discussion below is organized under the five major types of panvasive 
actions that have occupied the courts to date—inspections, checkpoints, drug 
testing, DNA sampling, and mass surveillance. It does not cover the cases in 
detail but rather focuses on the Court’s themes. In particular, it emphasizes 
the ways the Court has tried or failed to cabin executive discretion. 
A. Inspections 
The leading case on panvasive searches and seizures is Camara v. 
Municipal Court, involving a warrantless health and safety inspection of a 
residence.24 The Court held that when such an inspection is nonconsensual, 
it requires a warrant, but one founded on a type of “probable cause” quite 
different from its normal definition: rather than requiring probable cause to 
 
21 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). This language has 
since found its way into numerous other opinions, whether they involve panvasive actions, see 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding drug testing of athletes), or 
suspicion-based actions, see City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 756 (2010) (upholding a search 
of an employee’s text messages). The special needs moniker has thus done double-duty. See Eve 
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 259 (2011) (“[M]y 
central argument is that much of the mischief in administrative search law can be traced to the Supreme 
Court’s conflation of two distinct types of searches within one doctrinal exception . . . ‘dragnet searches’ 
and ‘special subpopulation searches.’”). 
22 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joining in an opinion upholding a 
search of a student’s purse by school officials). 
23 See infra text accompanying note 38. 
24 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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believe a particular home is violating municipal codes, issuance of an 
inspection warrant may be “based upon the passage of time, the nature of the 
building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire 
area,” and “will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the 
condition of the particular dwelling.”25 In other words, this type of search may 
be suspicionless, so long as it is based on a preexisting inspection plan relying 
on neutral criteria. In permitting this departure from the suspicion-based 
model, the Court found that the invasiveness of a home inspection is minimal, 
indeed often welcomed by the homeowner, and is outweighed by the 
government’s goal of ensuring area-wide health and safety.26 Implicit in the 
Court’s holding was the conclusion that this goal could not be achieved if the 
traditional probable cause requirement were applied in this setting. 
In a companion case, See v. City of Seattle, the Court held that businesses 
may be subject to similar suspicionless code inspections, as long as they occur 
“within the framework of a warrant procedure” like that approved in 
Camara.27 Ten years later, in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Court applied the 
same approach to inspections under the federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Act.28 Again, while a warrant was needed for nonconsensual entry, it 
could be based on “a general administrative plan for the enforcement of the 
Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion of 
employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired 
frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area.”29 
The Court has done away with even this diluted warrant requirement in 
cases involving “pervasively regulated” industries.30 Asserting that company 
owners who choose to be involved in such industries are on notice that they 
will be entitled to relatively little privacy from government monitoring,31 the 
Court has upheld warrantless nonconsensual inspections in cases involving 
 
25 Id. at 538 (emphasis added). 
26 See id. at 537 (“First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. 
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is 
doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. . . . Finally, because 
the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they 
involve a relatively limited invasion of . . . privacy.” (citation omitted)). 
27 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967). 
28 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
29 Id. at 321. 
30 This phrase first appeared in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), in which the 
Court upheld warrantless inspections of gun stores. 
31 See id. (“When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept 
a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition 
will be subject to effective inspection.”); see also Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313 (“[W]hen an entrepreneur 
embarks upon such a business [of gun and liquor sales], he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself 
to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.”). 
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liquor stores, gun stores, mining operations, and junkyards.32 However, the 
Court did not give the government carte blanche in these cases. In Donovan v. 
Dewey, for instance, it established that pervasively regulated industries are 
still entitled to demand “a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant,” 
such as a statute that defines the scope and timing of the inspections and the 
precise standards by which the business owner must abide.33 
Additionally, the Court has made clear that, despite the ubiquity of 
government regulation in virtually every commercial arena, not every 
business is pervasively regulated for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
While New York v. Burger held that junkyards, which the state of New York 
believed were often used to launder stolen automobile parts, fall into that 
category,34 the recent decision in City of Los Angeles v. Patel held that hotels, 
which the City of Los Angeles was worried might be used to facilitate drug 
and sex trafficking, are not pervasively regulated.35 Thus, whereas searches of 
junkyard records and lots are permissible in the absence of an ex ante 
determination (assuming a sufficiently specific authorizing statute exists),36 
under Patel, some type of “precompliance review” is necessary before police 
may search registries over the hotel owner’s objection.37 
At the same time, the Patel Court had no hesitation in labeling inspections 
of hotel registries a “special needs” situation (a label that it also applied, 
retroactively, to all of the foregoing cases).38 It concluded that the registry 
searches “serve a ‘special need’ other than conducting criminal investigations: 
They ensure compliance with the recordkeeping requirement, which in turn 
deters criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”39 Thus, as in its 
other inspection cases, the Court bowed to practicalities by signaling that 
police are not required to obtain a warrant to search the registry of a 
nonconsenting hotel, but rather can meet Fourth Amendment requirements 
if they obtain an “administrative subpoena” from a “neutral decisionmaker”; 
 
32 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (junkyards); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 
594, 602 (1981) (mining); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 313 (gun stores); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, 392 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) (liquor stores). 
33 Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603-04; see also Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 (“In the context of a regulatory 
inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality 
of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.”). 
34 Burger, 482 U.S. at 703-04. 
35 See 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2455 (2015) (“To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would permit 
what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”). 
36 Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03. 
37 See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2456 (finding a California ordinance unconstitutional because “it fails 
to provide any opportunity for precompliance review before a hotel must give its guest registry to 
the police for inspection”). 
38 See id. at 2452 (equating special needs searches with administrative searches like those 
authorized in Camara). 
39 Id. 
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further, the latter individual need not be a magistrate but rather can be an 
“administrative law judge.”40 While the subpoena can be quashed if the hotel 
owner shows the search was for “illicit purposes” or was “used as a pretext to 
harass,” presumably that showing can be made only if the officers admit their 
illicit purpose or, more likely, the officers failed to follow a neutral inspection 
plan in an evenhanded manner.41 Nothing in Patel requires that the 
government’s defense of its subpoena be based on explicit proof that the hotel 
is harboring criminals. Whether closely regulated or not, and whether their 
operation triggers special needs analysis or not, businesses subject to 
inspection can count on the protection of an ex ante policy aimed at 
minimizing abuses of discretion, but cannot demand a warrant or court order 
that requires individualized suspicion. 
B. Checkpoints 
A separate line of panvasive search and seizure cases involves checkpoints. At 
the Supreme Court level, the first such case was United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
which upheld a checkpoint near the border with Mexico that was aimed at 
detecting illegal immigrants.42 Citing Camara for the proposition that “the 
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized] 
suspicion,” the Court permitted suspicionless seizures of motorists at the 
initial checkpoint because of the minimal intrusion involved and the limits a 
checkpoint places on police discretion.43 On the latter point, the Court noted 
that the checkpoints were conducted in a “regularized manner” because they 
stopped only those cars that passed the checkpoint, thus minimizing “abusive 
or harassing stops.”44 Moreover, “[t]he location of a fixed checkpoint is not 
chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall 
decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources,” 
who, the Court assumed, “will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears 
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class.”45 
Using similar reasoning, the Court has upheld suspicionless stops on 
international waters (for the purpose of checking a boat’s documents),46 at 
sobriety checkpoints,47 and, in dictum, at license checkpoints.48 As in 
 
40 Id. at 2452-53. 
41 Id. at 2452-54. 
42 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976). 
43 Id. at 561-62. 
44 Id. at 559. 
45 Id. 
46 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1983). 
47 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
48 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (“This holding does not preclude the State 
of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or 
102 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 91 
Martinez-Fuerte, these cases sung the praises of the checkpoint’s “regularized” 
nature. For instance, in both Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (the 
sobriety case) and Delaware v. Prouse (the license case), the Court favorably 
distinguished checkpoints from “random stops,” which involve “[the] kind of 
standardless and unconstrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has 
discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official 
in the field be circumscribed.”49 
At the same time, the Court has given short shrift to the argument that 
checkpoint procedures do not restrict government power enough. In United 
States v. Villamonte-Marquez (the boat case), the Court responded to the 
argument that checking documents in port would limit discretion more than 
doing so at sea by noting that, given the wide open nature of sea travel and 
the fact that ships do not have to dock, such a requirement would make “less 
likely” the government’s ability “to accomplish the obviously essential 
governmental purposes involved.”50 In Sitz, the Court responded to the 
argument that watching for weaving vehicles could be even more effective than 
a sobriety checkpoint by stating that “the choice among . . . reasonable 
alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique 
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources, including a 
finite number of police officers.”51 Similarly, in still another roadblock case, 
Illinois v. Lidster, the Court sanctioned a roadblock at the scene of a hit-and-run 
accident that was designed to identify possible witnesses, implicitly finding 
irrelevant the dissent’s observation that a more effective, less intrusive 
method of finding witnesses might have been simply to put flyers on the cars 
of workers at nearby businesses.52 
The Court put its foot down, however, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
involving a checkpoint to detect narcotics using drug-sniffing dogs.53 Here, 
for the first time in a checkpoint case, the Court alluded to special needs 
analysis. According to the Court, that analysis did not apply because the 
“primary purpose” of the roadblock was “to uncover evidence of ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing”54—a “general interest in crime control”55—in contrast 
 
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at 
roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative.”). 
49 Id. at 661; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454 (reinforcing the Court’s decision in Prouse, but 
distinguishing DUI traffic stops because they are not based on decisions by officers in the field). 
50 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983). 
51 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453-54. 
52 540 U.S. 419, 428-30 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
that the issue of whether the roadblock was reasonable should be remanded, in part because planting 
flyers might have accomplished the State’s goal). 
53 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
54 Id. at 41-42. 
55 Id. at 40. 
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to the roadblocks at issue in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse’s dictum, which 
arose in the special contexts of border security and roadway safety.56 Since 
the cars in Edmond were stopped in the absence of individualized suspicion, 
the Fourth Amendment was violated.57 However, in a subsequent case, the 
Court signaled that if the “primary” purpose of a checkpoint is not ordinary 
crime control, the fact that drug-sniffing dogs might be present does not 
violate the Constitution so long as the dog sniff does not prolong the 
detention.58 Many lower courts have adopted this suggestion as a holding.59 
Lower courts have also been willing to slap the special needs moniker on 
checkpoints designed to catch terrorists. Most noteworthy is the opinion of 
Judge Sotomayor when she was on the Second Circuit, sitting on a case 
involving suspicionless searches of cars and people boarding ferries in New 
York State.60 Judge Sotomayor found the program to be a special needs 
situation because “[p]reventing or deterring large-scale terrorist attacks 
present problems that are distinct from standard law enforcement needs and 
indeed go well beyond them.”61 She reasoned that, because the Coast Guard 
had identified the Lake Champlain ferry as a potential target, and because 
the resulting searches of bags and car trunks were announced beforehand, 
lasted only a few moments, applied to everyone, and consisted of visual 
inspections of vehicles and brief examinations of carry-on baggage aimed at 
finding explosives, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.62 Citing the 
language from Sitz quoted above, she also dismissed the argument that the 
government should have used magnetometers to accomplish its goal in a less 
intrusive manner.63 
C. Drug Testing 
In contrast to inspection and checkpoint cases, special needs analysis has 
permeated drug testing cases from the beginning. Both Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Executives’ Association and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, companion cases upholding suspicionless drug testing programs of 
railway workers and customs agents, respectively, began with the proposition 
that the primary purpose of the programs was not to obtain evidence for 
 
56 Id. at 42-44 (distinguishing Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse). 
57 Id. at 47-48. 
58 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005). 
59 See Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes and Crime 
Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 298 (2006) (“[T]he weight of authority so far indicates 
that a secondary purpose of crime control will not upset a checkpoint with a lawful primary purpose.”). 
60 Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006). 
61 Id. at 82. 
62 Id. at 79-80, 87. 
63 Id. at 80, 85. 
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prosecution but rather to promote safety.64 Both cases went on to conclude 
that drug testing, while a search, is minimally intrusive, and that the 
government’s interest in ensuring its employees are not drug-impaired is 
significant, thus making a warrant unnecessary.65 But, echoing the inspection 
and checkpoint cases, the majority also emphasized that “in light of the 
standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those 
charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a 
neutral magistrate to evaluate.”66 
The Court came to similar conclusions in two cases involving drug 
testing in the school setting, the first aimed at student athletes67 and the 
second at students involved in any extracurricular activity.68 After 
concluding that these cases also came under the special needs rubric,69 the Court 
reasoned that a suspicionless testing program is permissible because school 
children expect less privacy, the government’s interest in deterring drug use 
among such a vulnerable population is compelling, and a suspicion-based 
program would be “impracticable.”70 In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (the 
student athlete case), the majority also asserted that a suspicion-based program 
might harm individual interests more than a group-wide one, given the 
likelihood that it would “transform[] the process into a badge of shame,” 
increase the potential for discriminatory action by teachers, and divert teachers 
from their normal functions.71 
The Court struck down two other drug testing programs, however. 
Chandler v. Miller confronted a law that required testing of every person 
seeking nomination or election to state office in Georgia.72 The Court applied 
the special needs label, but, for the first (and only) time in such a case, found 
that the government’s interest in the program, which it characterized as 
 
64 See Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (“The Government’s interest in regulating the conduct 
of railroad employees to ensure safety . . . [‘]presents “special needs” beyond normal law enforcement 
that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.’”); Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (“It is clear that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program is not designed 
to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement . . . [but] to deter drug use among those eligible for 
promotion to sensitive positions within the Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to 
those positions.”). 
65 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-31. 
66 Id. at 622. 
67 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
68 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
69 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-30. 
70 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657, 660-64; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (“[W]e question whether 
testing based on individualized suspicion in fact would be less intrusive. Such a regime would place 
an additional burden on public school teachers[,] . . . might unfairly target members of unpopular 
groups [and because of] fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted searches may chill enforcement 
of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use.”). 
71 515 U.S. at 663-64. 
72 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
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largely symbolic, was outweighed by the individual interests affected.73 It 
pointed out that candidates were given thirty-day notice of the testing (thus 
making it ineffectual), that their high profile meant that impairment on the 
job would be easily discoverable through normal means, and that evidence 
that there was any kind of drug problem among candidates was lacking 
(unlike in the school testing cases).74 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the 
Court refused to find that special needs analysis applied at all because, despite 
the city’s protestation that the goal of the program was to seek treatment for 
women who used drugs while pregnant and to save their babies, the police 
department was heavily involved in implementing the program and positive 
test results were sent to the police as a means of cajoling patients into such 
treatment.75 While the Court conceded that the ultimate goal of the program 
was “benign,” when doctors obtain test results from patients “for the specific 
purpose of incriminating those patients,” the Fourth Amendment prohibits a 
warrantless procedure unless the patient consents after being informed of 
how the results will be used.76 
D. DNA Sampling 
In Maryland v. King, the Court upheld a state program that permitted 
suspicionless DNA testing of every person charged with a crime of violence 
or burglary or an attempt to do so.77 Although the Court employed the type 
of balancing analysis that had become familiar in its special needs cases, and 
although it noted that its result was “in full accord” with that analysis, the 
Court explicitly held that King did not involve a special needs situation.78 The 
Court explained that the statute did not authorize “programmatic searches of 
either the public at large” (as in the inspection, checkpoint, and drug testing 
cases) “or a particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens” 
(as in New Jersey v. T.L.O., involving searches of school children79); rather, it 
was aimed at an adult arrested for crime, who “unlike . . . a citizen who has 
not been suspected of a wrong, . . . has a reduced expectation of privacy.”80 
 
73 Id. at 322. 
74 Id. at 319-20. 
75 See 532 U.S. 67, 79-80 (2001) (stating that “the critical difference” between previous drug 
testing cases and this one was that “the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its 
inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment”). 
76 Id. at 85-86 (emphasis omitted). 
77 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013). 
78 Id. at 1978. 
79 See 469 U.S. 325, 340-43 (1985) (holding that a search of a public school student’s purse did 
not require probable cause or a warrant given the diminished privacy expectations of students and 
the likelihood the warrant requirement would interfere with “maintenance of the swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools”). 
80 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1978. 
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The fact remains that, in addition to its usefulness in identifying 
arrestees,81 DNA is often helpful in convicting a person for the crime of arrest 
or in nabbing a perpetrator in the future; for instance, King was arrested for 
assault, but his DNA was eventually used to link him to an unrelated rape.82 
Some lower courts, recognizing that the search involved in DNA cases is 
principally designed for this purpose and thus could be seen as a suspicionless 
search for evidence of “ordinary crime,” have felt the need to justify DNA 
sampling on special needs grounds.83 They easily do so, reasoning that, at the 
time of the search, the government “is not trying to ‘determine that a 
particular individual has engaged in some specific wrongdoing.’”84 
Under either approach, balancing analysis applies and, for the Court in 
King, it was straightforward. The Court found that the buccal swab necessary 
to get a DNA sample is minimally intrusive, at least if, as required by 
Maryland law, all of those arrested for serious offenses are subject to it; that 
regime avoids judgment calls by officers whose perspective might otherwise 
be “colored by their primary involvement in ‘the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.’”85 The value of the DNA to the government, in 
contrast, can be significant, as the King case itself showed. 
E. Surveillance Programs 
Many surveillance programs operate by collecting information or 
observations about a large number of predominately law-abiding individuals 
in the hope that patterns of criminal activity can be discovered or that the 
data will subsequently help convict someone. Camera systems record activity 
in large sectors of urban areas twenty-four hours a day.86 Tracking systems 
can monitor every car traveling through areas under surveillance in real time 
 
81 The majority noted, inter alia, that DNA is more accurate than fingerprinting at identifying 
people, and thus better able to ensure that government officials obtain accurate information about 
an arrestee’s criminal history and dangerousness that can help in pretrial release and jail security 
decisions. Id. at 1971-75. 
82 Id. at 1966. The dissent argued that crime detection was the primary reason for the Maryland 
statute. See id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is obvious that no . . . noninvestigative motive 
exists in this case. The Court’s assertion that DNA is being taken, not to solve crimes, but to identify 
those in the State’s custody, taxes the credulity of the credulous.”). 
83 See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 667 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Mitchell, 
652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting special needs analysis, but applying balancing analysis to permit 
collection of DNA not only for identification purposes but for the purpose of solving other cases). 
84 Goord, 430 F.3d at 668 (quoting Report and Recommendation, Nicholas v. Goord, No. 01-
7891, 2003 WL 256774, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003)). 
85 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
12 (1968)). 
86 See generally THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC VIDEO 
SURVEILLANCE: A GUIDE TO PROTECTING COMMUNITIES AND PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
(2007) (describing video surveillance systems). 
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and retrospectively.87 And, as Edward Snowden told the world, the federal 
government at one time routinely swept up virtually everyone’s “metadata”—the 
identifying information about our communications—and may well have collected 
(and continue to collect) much more than that.88 
At the initial collection stage, all of these surveillance techniques are 
suspicionless; their whole point is to obtain and store information about a large 
population, presumably mostly innocent, for later analysis.89 The analysis stage, 
in contrast, is suspicion-based, whether it seeks patterns or is going after a 
particular individual.90 While the attempt to discern patterns—for instance, 
which cars visit a crime-ridden area, or which phones are used to contact 
someone in ISIS-held territory—can proceed anonymously via computer until 
the government observes the pattern of interest,91 the government can also 
easily “de-identify” most of the information it collects, at which point the 
suspicion model kicks in.92 A traditional suspicion-based search also takes place 
if the government already has a suspect or knows about a crime and uses the 
data to find out where the suspect is or who committed the crime.93 
 
87 See Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the Post–United States v. Jones 
Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L. REV. 553, 565-66 (2015) (noting that 
tracking systems allow common carriers, and therefore the government, to collect information from 
phones and cars about everyone’s travel over time). 
88 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the 
Internet,’ GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013, 8:56 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-
top-secret-program-online-data [https://perma.cc/K3VQ-HWBX] (describing a file provided by 
Snowden that purportedly discusses an NSA program called XKeyscore, which “allows analysts to 
search with no prior authorization through vast databases containing emails, online chats and the 
browsing histories of millions of individuals,” encompassing “nearly everything a typical user does 
on the internet”). 
89 Although Congress recently ended the NSA’s ability to engage in bulk collection of domestic 
metadata, which now must be stored with the common carrier, the NSA still collects metadata of calls made 
by or to an individual in the United States to or from someone overseas. Faiza Patel, Bulk Collection Under 
Section 215 Has Ended . . . What’s Next?, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 30, 2015, 2:25 PM), https://
www.justsecurity.org/27996/bulk-collection-ended-whats-next [https://perma.cc/9NXD-TUUG]. 
90 For instance, according to the NSA, the surveillance starts with a “seed identifier” such as a 
phone number or email address that the agency has “reasonable, articulable suspicion” to believe is 
associated with a terrorist organization. The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight 
and Partnerships, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nsa.gov/news-
features/press-room/statements/2013-08-09-the-nsa-story.shtml [https://perma.cc/72MK-5X2K]. 
91 See id. (“Technical controls preclude NSA analysts from seeing any metadata unless it is the 
result of a query using an approved identifier.”); see also Shaun B. Spencer, When Targeting Becomes 
Secondary: A Framework for Regulating Predictive Surveillance in Antiterrorism Investigations, 92 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 493, 496 (2015) (noting that current law fails to grapple with the collection and 
anonymous-analysis phase of terrorism investigations). 
92 See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1706 (2010) (asserting that “advances in reidentification thwart the aims of 
nearly every privacy law and regulation”). 
93 See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 191-96 (2007) (describing “event-driven” surveillance). 
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The focus of this discussion of panvasive surveillance, then, is the 
collection stage. While the Supreme Court has yet to deal with this precise 
issue, some lower courts, relying on Supreme Court precedent, have held that 
data compilation does not even trigger the Fourth Amendment, at least if the 
information compiled concerns activity in public or data surrendered to a 
third party such as an internet service provider or a phone company (as is the 
case with the metadata program).94 At least one court has bucked this trend, 
holding that the NSA’s metadata collection program is a Fourth Amendment 
“search,” and strongly suggesting that, even under special needs reasoning, 
the program is unconstitutional given the government’s failure to provide 
evidence that the program has detected any terrorists.95 Even if this view 
prevails in the metadata context, however, it may not transfer to the type of 
information collected via cameras and tracking devices, where courts have 
been reluctant to find that the Fourth Amendment applies.96 
F. Summary 
Surveying the courts’—and, in particular, the Supreme Court’s—decisions 
in panvasive search and seizure cases as a whole, four themes stand out. First, 
the courts are concerned with whether the program is in aid of “ordinary crime 
control” or aimed at something else. Second, if the primary goal of the 
program is something other than crime control, the courts do not require 
individualized suspicion but rather engage in balancing the government’s 
interest against the privacy and autonomy interests of those affected in 
figuring out the degree of protection warranted. Third, the panvasive nature 
of the search and seizure tends to enhance the government’s position because, 
in the courts’ eyes, its regularized nature diminishes the impact on privacy at 
the same time as it limits official discretion. Finally, while the Supreme Court 
 
94 See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the “collection 
of breathtaking amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does not transform 
that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search,” and, relying on Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 
(1979), holding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection program to be constitutional), vacated 
in part, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. 13-109, slip op. at 9 (FISA Ct. 
Aug. 29, 2013) (relying on Smith to conclude that, because the Application concerned only call detail 
records or telephony metadata, there was no Fourth Amendment impediment to the collection). 
95 See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43-44 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding the metadata 
program unconstitutional but staying the decision pending review by the appellate courts). 
96 See State v. Augafa, 992 P.2d 723, 725 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that “open and visible 
video camera surveillance of the public sidewalk area on which Defendant was situated was not 
violative of Defendant’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches”); see also United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a court order mandating the production of cell 
phone records did not violate the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 
344-45 (4th Cir. 2015) (“We hold that the government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment 
when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user’s historical CSLI for an extended period of time.”). 
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is influenced by evidence that a suspicion-based approach would render the 
government’s goal very difficult to achieve, it is usually unmoved by evidence 
that such an approach could provide an effective alternative. 
One other aspect of these cases bears emphasis. Despite the fact that all 
of them involve panvasive actions pursuant to policies promulgated and 
implemented by law enforcement agencies, the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly turned to administrative law for help in its analysis. Outside of 
allusions to that course of action in its inspection cases (discussed in Part III), 
the Court is content with an ad hoc approach that adopts no particular 
regulatory structure. Partly as a result, its jurisprudence in this area is a mass 
of contradictions, as the next Part makes clear. 
II. THE COURT AND ITS CRITICS 
A comparison of the decisions that approve panvasive searches and 
seizures to those that do not reveals an embarrassingly incoherent 
jurisprudence. Other commentators have criticized these cases, but not in the 
comparative way undertaken here. Nor have commentators been particularly 
successful at improving the analysis of panvasive searches and seizures. After 
critiquing the Court’s cases, this Part analyzes the primary competitor to the 
Court’s approach, which I call the strict scrutiny model because it tracks that 
type of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. This Part also examines the work of 
commentators who have proposed a third alternative—legislative and 
administrative regulation that is encouraged through judicial means—and 
begins to distinguish that approach from the more straightforward 
administrative law tack proposed in this Article. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Free-For-All 
The Supreme Court’s cases dealing with panvasive searches and seizures 
are difficult to figure out. With respect to each of the four themes identified 
above—the ordinary crime threshold, balancing analysis, regularization, and 
the availability of alternatives—the Court has sent conflicting signals. 
Explicitly since the creation of the special needs rubric and implicitly 
before then, the Court has permitted panvasive searches and seizures only 
when special circumstances beyond “ordinary crime control” are involved.97 
But virtually all panvasive searches and seizures—most obviously DNA 
sampling and surveillance,98 but also those that involve inspections, 
checkpoints, or drug testing—are aimed at crime control. Most regulatory 
 
97 See supra Part I. 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 81–88. 
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inspections are backed up by criminal sanctions.99 Criminal charges not only 
arise out of stops at narcotics checkpoints, which the Court has declared are 
not a special needs situation, but also routinely follow Court-approved stops 
at sobriety checkpoints, checkpoints for illegal immigrants, and checkpoints 
in international waters (and, indeed, the litigants in all of the relevant Court 
cases were subject to criminal charges).100 And while it is true that the threat 
of criminal prosecution was particularly explicit in the drug testing program 
struck down in Ferguson,101 the possibility of criminal charges hovers in the 
background any time someone tests positive for an illegal substance. Further, 
serious quasi-criminal consequences (suspension from employment or school 
activities, for instance) are virtually inevitable.102 
The difficulties that the Court’s case law have created are evident in Patel, 
the Court’s most recent foray into this area. There, the Court “assumed” that 
the searches authorized by the city’s hotel registry inspection ordinance 
“serve[d] a ‘special need’ other than conducting criminal investigations,” to wit 
“deter[ring] criminals from operating on the hotels’ premises.”103 Not explained 
was why deterrence of crime is not considered an aspect of “ordinary” police 
work, but investigation of crime is. In any event, surely the Los Angeles city 
council that enacted the ordinance was just as interested in detecting criminals 
who were on hotel premises as it was in deterring them from frequenting such 
places. There can be no deterrence without the possibility of detection; every 
panvasive search and seizure program tries to accomplish both goals. 
More fundamentally, the Court has never made clear why the distinction 
between crime control and its opposite (perhaps regulatory control?) matters. 
Apparently, the idea is that those suspected of “ordinary crime” are entitled 
 
99 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (junkyard owner arrested for five counts 
of possessing stolen property found during inspection); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) 
(pawn shop operator convicted of dealing in firearms without having paid occupational tax, as the 
result of an inspection); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (store owner 
suspected of refilling liquor bottles, which under 26 U.S.C. § 5301(e) can bring a criminal penalty 
of up to one year). 
100 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (suit seeking to enjoin sobriety 
checkpoint, making clear that those found drunk would be arrested); United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (boarding of boat based on 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which sets out penalties 
for faulty documents); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (driver stopped at 
checkpoint near border charged with two counts of illegally transporting aliens); see also supra notes 
58–59 and accompanying text (describing license checkpoints accompanied by drug-sniffing dogs). 
101 See supra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
102 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 683 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he substantial consequences that can flow from a positive test, such as suspension from sports, are 
invariably—and quite reasonably—understood as punishment.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 650 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he agency’s regulations . . . appear to invite 
criminal prosecutors to obtain the blood and urine samples drawn by [railway authorities] and use them 
as the basis of criminal investigations and trials.”). 
103 City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). 
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to greater constitutional recognition because of the greater deprivation of 
liberty associated with arrest and conviction for a crime. But as Justice White 
pointed out in Camara, the first panvasive search and seizure case, “It is surely 
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully 
protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected 
of criminal behavior.”104 
Once denominated a special needs situation, a panvasive search or seizure 
is subjected to balancing analysis under the reasonableness clause.105 Here, 
too, the Court has sent mixed messages, in part because of its confusing stance 
on the crime control distinction. One way of demonstrating the confusion is 
by considering the Court’s cases by category (e.g., inspections, checkpoints, 
and drug testing). That method of analysis allows both the level of intrusion 
and the degree of regularization—important to the second and third themes 
identified above—to be held constant, and exposes the Court’s inconsistency. 
Thus, for instance, while the Court considered detection of stolen car parts 
in New York sufficiently important to allow suspicionless inspection of 
junkyard records,106 it was apparently not as concerned about detecting the 
drug, sex, and human trafficking allegedly transpiring in a large number of 
Los Angeles hotels.107 Likewise, interdiction of narcotics transportation was 
not considered an important enough goal to justify the checkpoint in 
Edmond,108 while detecting illegal immigration, drunk driving, and suspended 
licenses were adequate grounds for permitting the checkpoints discussed in 
Martinez-Fuerte,109 Sitz,110 and Prouse.111 While the Court might well be right 
that the government’s interest in stopping drug use by political candidates is 
less substantial than its interest in detecting drug use among railway workers, 
 
104 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 522, 530 (1967). 
105 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated 
to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and 
probable-cause requirements in the particular context.”). 
106 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703, 709 (1987) (noting that “regulation of the 
vehicle-dismantling industry reasonably serves the State’s substantial interest in eradicating 
automobile theft”). 
107 See Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2457 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “the parties do not dispute” 
that motels “are a particularly attractive site for criminal activity ranging from drug dealing and 
prostitution to human trafficking”). 
108 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (stating that “the gravity of the 
threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law enforcement officers may 
employ to pursue a given purpose”). 
109 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“[M]aintenance of a 
traffic-checking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be 
controlled effectively at the border.”). 
110 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one can seriously 
dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating it.”). 
111 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) (recognizing states’ “vital interest in 
ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles”). 
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customs agents, and school children,112 the protection of unborn babies from 
their mothers’ substance abuse would seem to trump most or all of these other 
goals; yet, the Court’s decision in Ferguson stands for the contrary proposition.113 
Of course, a balancing analysis can consider a host of other factors, the most 
important of which raises the fourth theme found in the Court’s cases: the 
efficacy of a panvasive search or seizure compared to its feasible alternatives. 
As with the other factors, however, the Court’s reliance on this factor is erratic. 
Consider again the Court’s cases by category, in reverse order this time. In the 
drug testing cases, the relative efficacy factor points in precisely the opposite 
direction of the Court’s conclusions: suspicion of drug use by school children 
and employees is much easier to develop than suspicion of drug use by 
pregnant mothers, who are not subject to the constant monitoring that the 
first two groups are.114 The same assertion can be made about the Court’s 
checkpoint decisions. Developing a good hunch in a case like Edmond (where 
the working assumption of the police was that drug traffickers were hiding 
drugs in their cars115) is significantly more difficult than in cases like Sitz 
(involving drunk driving, which is often observable) or Martinez-Fuerte 
(involving illegal immigration, also usually observable), 116 yet the Court gave 
the government a break only in the latter settings. And if, as the Court has 
indicated in its Patel decision, the government’s concern about precompliance 
review (which might tip off miscreant hotel owners) can be alleviated by seizing 
the hotel’s records pending a subpoena,117 why isn’t the same procedure required 
in the junkyard, gun shop, and liquor store settings?118 
 
112 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (contrasting Georgia’s concerns about drug 
use by political candidates with “the evidence of drug and alcohol use by railway employees engaged 
in safety-sensitive tasks in Skinner, and the immediate crisis prompted by a sharp rise in students’ 
use of unlawful drugs in Vernonia” (citations omitted)). 
113 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71 (2001) (holding that nonconsensual, 
suspicionless drug testing of pregnant women violated the Fourth Amendment, despite “an apparent 
increase in the use of cocaine by patients who were receiving prenatal treatment”). 
114 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“In most schools, the entire pool of potential search targets—students—is under constant supervision 
by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms.”). 
115 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000) (characterizing the highway 
checkpoint program as one “to interdict unlawful drugs”). 
116 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 461-62 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting a study showing that Michigan police, using normal investigative techniques, made 71,000 
such arrests in one year); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 575 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court had held that stops based on reasonable suspicion could be based 
on factors such as the type of car, its apparent load, and whether it contains an extraordinary number 
of people or people trying to hide (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975))). 
117 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2454 (2015) (“In most contexts, business 
owners can be afforded at least an opportunity to contest an administrative search’s propriety 
without unduly compromising the government’s ability to achieve its regulatory aims.”). 
118 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 710 (1987) (upholding a statute that permitted 
warrantless entry into a junkyard, stating that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at 
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The Supreme Court purports to have developed coherent rationales in its 
panvasive search and seizure decisions. That is far from the case. While Part 
IV of this Article agrees with the Court that regularization is a crucial 
requirement in panvasive cases, and also contends that efficacy considerations 
should be pertinent, these factors, as applied by the Court, are singularly poor 
at explaining the results the Court has reached. 
B. The Strict Scrutiny Alternative 
Many commentators have lambasted the Court’s decisions on panvasive 
searches and seizures, usually on the ground that they take insufficient 
account of the privacy intrusion involved and the possible alternatives to 
suspicionless action. Most of these commentators have proposed instead 
some version of what could be called a strict scrutiny model of analysis.119 
Under this model, courts would determine (1) whether the government 
objective is “compelling” and (2) whether the investigative technique chosen 
by the government is the least restrictive way of achieving it. 
An initial concern with the strict scrutiny model is that, in other 
constitutional contexts, this type of analysis has always been reserved for 
governmental actions that affect “fundamental” rights or engage in suspect 
classifications.120 While the Fourth Amendment’s right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches and seizures is, as a general matter, fundamental, the 
Court’s cases reasonably recognize that not all searches and seizures are equally 
intrusive or equally deserving of similar protection.121 It is surely a stretch to 
 
remedying this major social problem is to function at all”); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 
316 (1972) (upholding warrantless entry of a gun store for inspection purposes on the ground that 
“if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, 
inspections are essential”); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) 
(upholding criminal conviction for refusal to permit an inspector’s entry into a liquor storeroom). 
119 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 21, at 261-62 (arguing that dragnets should not be permitted if 
individualized suspicion can accomplish the government’s objective); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The 
Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 483, 487 (1995) (arguing that suspicionless searches and seizures should be “aberrational” and 
founded on “a strong showing of governmental necessity”); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment 
in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1173, 1176-77 (1988) (arguing for least drastic means analysis); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to 
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 446 (1988) 
(arguing for a compelling state interest or least intrusive means test that “unambiguously reorients 
fourth amendment analysis toward protection of the individual’s privacy interest”). 
120 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, 
Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring) (“[A] government practice or statute which restricts 
‘fundamental rights’ . . . is to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and can be justified only if it furthers 
a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available.”). 
121 This is a principle with which I agree, albeit with significant caveats about how the Court 
applies it. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 93, at 21-47 (defending a Fourth Amendment justification 
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say that a search of an impersonal business property or a fifteen-second seizure 
at a roadblock implicates the same “fundamental right” as a search of a bedroom 
or an arrest.122 At the least, scrutiny of lesser types of searches and seizures 
might call for modulation of both the word “compelling” in the first stage of 
the analysis and the phrase “least restrictive” in the second. 
More important as a practical matter, while the two queries generated by 
strict scrutiny analysis are routinely raised and answered in other contexts, 
they are close to imponderable in the criminal justice setting. That is because, 
in structure, the strict scrutiny model is no different than the Court’s special 
needs approach. Indeed, precisely because the model requires stronger proof 
than the Court has demanded concerning both the importance of the 
government’s interest and the difficulty of achieving it through other means, 
it is even more likely to raise the conundra the Court’s analysis does. 
Begin with the first, “compelling interest,” prong of strict scrutiny 
analysis. Even with the thumb on the scale implied by the word “compelling,” 
the inquiry into the strength of the government’s objectives sends judges into 
a morass. Courts are understandably loathe to say that the state does not have 
a strong interest in stifling illegal immigration, drunk driving, and safety code 
violations, much less terrorism. Nor is gauging the government’s interest at 
less abstract levels any easier. Consider the following statistics from the 
checkpoint cases: 0.12% of those stopped at the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte 
were illegal immigrants,123 1.6% of those stopped at the checkpoint in Sitz 
were drunk,124 and (very perturbingly) almost 9% of those stopped at the 
checkpoint in Edmond had narcotics or other illegal items in their cars.125 
Initially, the government’s interest seems stronger in the latter case (where 
the government lost) than in the other two (where it won). At the same time, 
the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte handled a much greater traffic flow (which 
might have lowered the hit rate) and was more permanent (and thus perhaps 
a better deterrent) than the checkpoints in the other two cases.126 These 
considerations about the size of the hit rates in these cases and what they 
 
scheme based on proportionality reasoning, but requiring suspicion in many cases where the Court 
requires none). 
122 See id. at 112, 184 (providing data showing that the “intrusion” associated with different 
investigative techniques varies significantly); see also MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION 
MATTERS 152-53 (2010) (“How can we deal with deep and persisting disagreement about what our 
fundamental rights are? By coming to grips with the fact that these disagreements are reasonable, 
no different in principle from our disagreements about how to finance a national health care policy 
or about the proper tax rate for capital gains.”). 
123 Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
124 Id. 
125 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000). 
126 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (explaining the rationale for 
situating checkpoints along important highways). 
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mean pose, at the least, a major challenge in deciding whether they 
demonstrate a significant problem. 
Since the government’s interest can almost always be made to look 
compelling,127 advocates of the strict scrutiny alternative will usually have to 
fall back on the second prong of the scrutiny analysis, involving assessments of 
whether suspicion-based searches and seizures or some other “less restrictive” 
alternative can achieve the government’s goal. This prong presents even more 
of a quandary, however, because it requires evaluation of variables that courts 
are ill-equipped to assess, specifically the impact of a given panvasive program 
compared to its suspicion-based alternative. That is probably why, as indicated 
earlier, the Supreme Court has completely shied away from the subject. 
Consider the following questions about the potential alternatives to the 
panvasive actions involved in the cases discussed in Part I: 
• First, there are questions about the efficacy of suspicion-based 
alternatives: For instance, are suspicion-based car stops more effective 
than checkpoints at detecting and inhibiting illegal immigrants, 
drunk drivers, and drivers transporting narcotics, or are widely 
publicized checkpoints likely to have a greater deterrent effect?128 
Will drug testing that can only take place if some type of impairment 
is perceived be as protective of students in schools and passengers on 
railway trains as the drug testing programs aimed at those groups in 
Vernonia and Skinner?129 Is the low hit rate of the NSA’s metadata 
program130 a sign of failure, or is it evidence that the program is a 
 
127 This is so even in cases where the government loses or has little data. See, e.g., Ferguson v. 
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001) (noting that the Charleston hospital staff had noticed an 
increase in cocaine use among women seeking prenatal care); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 324 
(1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, despite the absence of evidence indicating a significant 
drug abuse problem among political candidates, that “surely the State need not wait for a drug 
addict, or one inclined to use drugs illegally, to run for or actually become Governor before it installs 
a prophylactic mechanism”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989) 
(concluding that, even though there was no evidence of a serious drug abuse problem among customs 
agents, “the Government has demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders 
and the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek to be promoted to 
positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal drugs or that require the incumbent to carry 
a firearm”). 
128 Compare supra text accompanying note 51, with U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS: 
SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN LITERATURE 14 (1992), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/25000/25800/25836/
DOT-HS-807-862.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ77-N28Q] (finding that prior studies support the 
hypothesis that sobriety checkpoints can deter impaired driving). 
129 Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 680 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“I 
recognize that a suspicion-based scheme, even where reasonably effective in controlling in-school 
drug use, may not be as effective as a mass, suspicionless testing regime.”). 
130 Compare Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intel from Americans’ Metadata. So 
End Collection, GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2013, 12:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/oct/08/nsa-bulk-metadata-surveillance-intelligence [https://perma.cc/SF75-7DU9] (arguing 
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significant deterrent, and should it matter that prohibiting collection 
and retention of metadata will gravely hinder the government’s ability 
to investigate the communication history of an individual it 
subsequently suspects of terrorism?131 
• Second, there are questions about the efficacy of alternatives to panvasive 
actions that are not suspicion-based. For instance, are the Lidster dissent’s 
flyers or the magnetometer rejected by Judge Sotomayor in Cassidy (the 
ferry case) as likely to achieve the government’s goal as the method 
chosen by the government? Should the Court in Ferguson have considered 
the likelihood that its ruling would replace a program that gave pregnant 
cocaine users a second and third chance with a rule that imposes a “more 
rigorous system?”132 If, as is likely, DNA testing of arrestees is more 
effective at clearing unsolved crime than suspicion-based testing, why 
isn’t DNA testing of the entire population permissible for the same 
reason?133 Alternatively, if DNA testing of arrestees is held to be 
impermissible, is DNA testing of convicted felons impermissible as well, 
or is it permissible on the ground that it will generate a higher percentage 
of clearances? 
• Finally, there are comparative questions about the intrusiveness of these 
various alternatives to panvasive actions. Are panvasive actions affecting 
large groups of people more inimical to government legitimacy or, as 
suggested by the majority in Vernonia,134 are suspicion-based actions 
that end up erroneously, and perhaps discriminatorily, singling out 
individuals more likely to antagonize the populace and occasion a 
greater overall sense of intrusiveness?135 
 
that the marginal evidence of the effectiveness of the NSA’s metadata collection program calls for 
the discontinuance of the program), with ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(recounting three terrorist plots allegedly foiled through metadata analysis), vacated in part, 785 F.3d 
787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
131 See Rahul Srinivas, Edward Snowden’s Revelations Have ‘Clearly Helped the ISIS’, Claims Former 
NSA Official, INQUISITR (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1454270/edward-snowden-helped-
isis [https://perma.cc/96U5-7CB9] (discussing a former NSA official’s comments regarding the 
negative impact that Edward Snowden’s revelations had on the government’s counterterrorism effort). 
132 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 90 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (after 
noting that doctors could, for legitimate medical reasons, test pregnant women for cocaine, and that 
prosecutors could “adopt legitimate procedures” to obtain this information, stating that “[o]ne of 
the ironies of the case, then, may be that the program now under review, which gives the cocaine 
user a second and third chance, might be replaced by some more rigorous system”). 
133 See generally Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of DNA, 48 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 261 (2015) (arguing that such a system is constitutionally permissible). 
134 See supra text accompanying note 71. 
135 See Tom R. Tyler et al., The Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of 
Proactive Police Contact, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 603 (2015) (“Our argument is that it is 
not contact with the police per se that is problematic. . . . Rather it is contact that communicates 
suspicion and mistrust that undermines the relationship between the public and the police.”). 
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These types of questions do not begin to exhaust the list of issues that 
strict scrutiny analysis needs to address in these cases. There may be answers 
to them, but the answers will not be easy. Arguably, these empirical quagmires 
are better left to legislatures and the executive branch.136 That, at least, is the 
assumption that informs the work of those commentators who have argued 
that the political process may be a better mechanism for regulating many 
types of police work. 
C. The New Administrativists 
Andrew Crespo recently coined the term “new adminstrativist” to 
describe a resurgent trend in criminal justice scholarship that suggests that 
legislatures and administrative agencies are often better situated than courts 
to identify and constrain abuses of state power in the criminal justice system, 
and thus protect core constitutional rights and liberties.137 On this view, the 
capacity of the political branches to address issues in a comprehensive and 
data-driven fashion, rather than through the case-by-case and relatively 
intuition-laden manner usually prevalent in the courts, makes them better at 
evaluating the systemic effects of criminal procedure rules; this structural 
approach may, in turn, result in superior protection of constitutional rights as 
a pragmatic matter.138 The argument is also made, particularly by those who 
are concerned about the advent of surveillance technologies, that legislatures 
and the executive branch can be more responsive to rapidly changing 
investigative techniques, and also devise more creative means of regulating 
 
136 The literature on interbranch competencies is vast and will not be regurgitated here. See 
generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (4th ed. 2007). For my own take on the issue, 
see Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1733-45 (2014), which provides arguments based on political process 
theory as to why legislative approaches should normally be preferred in devising panvasive policies. 
137 See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal 
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2059 (2016) (describing “contemporary scholars” who advocate a 
“pivot toward agency-centric regulation of law enforcement authority . . . leveraging valuable 
insights from administrative law in the hopes of righting [the] criminal justice system”). 
138 Id. at 2051-54; see also Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 515, 603 (2000) (arguing, in the criminal justice context, for “a relaxed administrative-type 
rulemaking process . . . that draws upon but is not constrained by [the APA or state equivalents]”); 
John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205, 213 (2015) 
(“[I]n some areas of criminal procedure regularly litigated in criminal cases, second-order regulation 
should benefit defendants overall, while freeing political policy makers to choose the most cost-effective 
constitutional safeguards that will get the job done.”); Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as 
Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1045, 1111 (2016) (noting that administrative 
agencies can be “more systematic and data-driven” than courts and thus can be more “holistic” in 
their approach to regulating law enforcement). 
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them, than courts that must both wait for a case and controversy and resolve it 
based on hidebound precedent that offers only a few options.139 Further, Barry 
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have forcefully contended that political 
institutions should be brought into the picture to ensure that police are 
accountable for their actions through the democratic process, a move which 
they believe might be preferable to a regulatory regime based on exclusion or 
damages in individual cases.140 In short, the new administrativists posit that 
administrative law can help fill in the gaps left by constitutional jurisprudence. 
I place myself in the new administrativist category. In other work, I have 
argued that administrative law principles can help ensure that police practices 
are authorized, rationalized, and transparent, even if the Fourth Amendment 
has little or nothing to say about them.141 But neither my previous work nor that 
of the other new administrativists sufficiently addresses three crucial issues. 
First, and probably most importantly, little is said about how legislatures 
and agencies are to be motivated to produce constitutionally sufficient 
regulatory regimes.142 The usual suggestion is to use the Fourth Amendment 
as leverage. On this view, courts should announce that, unless legislatures and 
agencies specifically authorize the police conduct, it should be declared 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.143 Outside of a few isolated 
 
139 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (“I contend that the legislative branch rather 
than the judiciary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is changing.”); 
Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 925 (2004) (“The case for 
court review of reasonable procedures [rather than substantive review] is significantly stronger if 
limited to the context of emerging technologies.”). 
140 See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1875 (2015) (“[J]udicial review is not, and could not possibly be, a substitute for democratic 
accountability. Yet, democratic review is what is necessary to strike the policy balance that rests at 
the bottom of policing decisions.”). 
141 Slobogin, supra note 136, at 1758-75. 
142 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 138, at 256-57 (suggesting the Court will voluntarily resort 
to a second-order regime once it realizes its epistemic and political advantages); Renan, supra note 
138, at 1108 (recognizing that “[c]ourts have been reluctant to evaluate programmatic efficacy under 
the Fourth Amendment,” but offering no mechanism for overcoming that reluctance). The one 
exception is found in Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140. These authors argue that “courts 
ought to defer to police decisions about enforcement methods only to the extent that those decisions 
represent considered, fact-based judgments formulated with democratic input,” and propose five 
ways in which courts can encourage such judgments. Id. at 1892-1903. But all of their prescriptions 
require courts to act in ways that, in recent years at least, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to 
pursue; at bottom, these authors, too, do not provide a coercive mechanism for implementing 
administrative principles, which they suggest are insufficient in any event. Cf. id. at 1883 (“The risk 
of arbitrariness in this context is far too great to give policing agencies the same discretion to forego 
rulemaking that the APA gives to traditional administrative agencies.”). 
143 See, e.g., id. at 1898 (“Courts can refuse deference when there is a constitutional doubt, but 
by the same token they can accord deference if policing is governed by rules that are the product of 
sound democratic processes.”); Swire, supra note 139, at 925 (adapting Anthony Amsterdam’s 
formulation that defines reasonableness primarily in terms of whether a search or seizure “is 
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contexts, however, the Supreme Court has demonstrated no inclination to 
pursue this route, and on the few occasions when it has held that legislative 
or executive policies can fulfill the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness 
requirement (discussed in Part III), it has indicated that virtually any policy 
will do.144 Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment is useless as leverage, even 
in this weak sense, in situations that do not infringe reasonable expectations 
of privacy; unfortunately, those situations include police use of many of the 
surveillance and datamining techniques that the new administrativists would 
like to see regulated.145 
Second, assuming we get the political branches to act, the new 
administrativists are unduly sanguine about the ability of legislatures and 
their delegatees to avoid catering to law enforcement interests. Admittedly, 
there are examples of legislation providing the same or even greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment requires.146 But as Part I demonstrated, numerous 
other domains have been left alone or regulated only minimally by the other 
two branches. Presumably, this void is due at least in part to collective action 
problems; law enforcement entities are better organized and their needs more 
salient to legislatures than are the needs of the groups that are most directly 
affected by the police.147 Claims that police will impose limits on themselves 
 
conducted pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and 
regulations” (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 416 (1974))); Peter P. Swire & Erin E. Murphy, How to Address Standardless Discretion 
After Jones 2 (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies at the Ohio State Univ. Mortiz Coll. 
of Law, Working Paper No. 177, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2122941 [https://perma.cc/4KUY-
FX2F] (arguing that if no legislation or executive branch policies exist, the intrusion should be declared 
unreasonable, but that if such policies do exist, “the court would assess their constitutionality,” a review 
that “although meaningful, would be deferential and structural in nature”). 
144 See infra text accompanying notes 192–95 (describing the Court’s inspection cases); see also 
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (holding that, while an inventory of items in a car is only valid 
if conducted pursuant to a policy, “policies of opening all containers or of opening no containers are 
unquestionably permissible [as are policies that] allow the opening of closed containers whose 
contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the containers’ exteriors”). 
145 See supra note 8. 
146 The best example is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518 (2012), which allows a warrant for interception of oral and wire communications to be issued 
only if “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be 
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” and only if the warrant directs that the 
interception “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not 
otherwise subject to interception,” two requirements that go beyond standard Fourth Amendment 
rules. Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 55, 59 (1967) (invalidating a New York statute 
permitting eavesdropping in part because it authorized officers to seize any and all conversations 
based on a reasonable ground to believe that evidence of a crime may be obtained). 
147 Probably the best known account of this problem is found in Donald A. Dripps, Criminal 
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About 
the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079-81 (1993), which asserts that legislatures 
have done little by way of limiting the discretion of police because “an overwhelming preponderance 
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once they are made to understand the full impact of their power,148 or that 
the rules that come from self-regulation will result in more overall protection 
because they will be better obeyed than stricter Fourth Amendment standards 
imposed by distant and unempathetic courts,149 ring hollow in light of the 
multifaceted pressure to fight crime the police face on a daily basis.150 
Third, even assuming a less one-sided rulemaking environment, the new 
administrativists tend to be vague about the way administrative principles 
will ensure robust limitations on law enforcement. Reference is made to 
notice-and-comment procedures and similar administrative law standbys, but 
detail as to how they would work in the law enforcement context is usually 
lacking.151 More thought needs to go into formulating both the necessary 
process and the substance of policing as administration. 
The burden of Part III is to address these issues. It first explains why law 
enforcement must abide by administrative principles, at least where panvasive 
actions are involved. It then explains how those principles can reduce public 
choice pressures and ensure that police discretion is limited. 
III. WHY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPLIES TO PANVASIVE  
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
Administrative agencies exist in large part because legislatures (and 
courts) do not have the expertise or resources to deal with the complex 
regulatory issues that arise in a modern state.152 For most agencies, that 
 
of political incentives favor unrestricted enforcement of the criminal law, even if this means abusive 
police methods.” 
148 See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 95 
(1969) (“[E]ven the police themselves need to be educated in the realities of what they are doing; 
many of them would refuse to participate if they were more sharply aware of the realities.”). 
149 See Rappaport, supra note 138, at 255 (“We should not regret the loss of paper-tiger rights 
if they are replaced with rules that, because better obeyed, will actually improve net social realities.”). 
150 See Albert T. Quick, Attitudinal Aspects of Police Compliance with Procedural Due Process, 6 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 25, 28-33 (1978) (describing training, peer, organizational, prosecutorial, and 
political pressures on the police that contribute to a “crime control bias” on the part of the police). 
151 Renan is probably the most specific, but she suggests that, to ensure administrative 
principles apply to surveillance agencies, current law would have to be interpreted in an innovative 
fashion. Renan, supra note 138, at 1082-85; see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1877 
(calling for “clearer legislative authorization on the front end, rules adopted by police departments 
themselves through a transparent process that allows for public participation, or some other method 
of obtaining community input into policing policy”); Swire & Murphy, supra note 143, at 3 
(proposing, in toto, that courts look at the extent to which the statute minimizes government 
intrusions and includes “mechanisms of transparency and accountability”). 
152 See Patricia M. Wald, The “New Administrative Law”—with the Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 647, 658-59 (“[A]sking judges to familiarize themselves enough with the policies and 
operations of the dozens of agencies that appear in hundreds of cases a year, and whose functions 
vary from labor to shipping to nuclear energy to gas regulation, so that we can participate as equals 
in their good governance, is asking a great deal.”); Peter Marra, Comment, Have Administrative 
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expertise is exercised within the substantive and procedural constraints of the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its state and local 
equivalents.153 While the Constitution supplies the legal backdrop, 
administrative law is the primary means of regulating most agencies.154 
The analogy to police departments is straightforward. Police and other 
law enforcement agencies possess expertise about the various ways the 
criminal law and associated regulatory statutes can be enforced that 
legislatures (and courts) usually do not have. Police agencies are much better 
positioned to make decisions about resource allocation and the relative 
efficacy of enforcement methods than are other institutions.155 The assertion 
made here is that, as in other administrative contexts, exercise of that 
expertise should be mediated through administrative law. 
If administrative law were the template governing panvasive searches and 
seizures, the relevant inquiries would not be about whether the primary 
purpose of a program is crime control or whether that purpose is compelling, 
nor would they center on the program’s efficacy compared to a suspicion-based 
regime. Rather, as is the case with the programs of other agencies, the focus 
would be on whether the police department has followed a rational procedure 
that produced a rational policy consistent with legislative directives and on 
whether the policy is implemented in an evenhanded manner.156 While this 
regulatory regime is fairly deferential to police-initiated programs, it would 
impose more structured constraints on them than current Supreme Court law 
does. In fact, an administrative law regime of the type described below would 
not countenance the outcomes in many of the cases in which the Court has 
approved panvasive searches and seizures, or at least would place a heavier 
burden on the government in order to prevail. 
 
Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 777 (1996) (describing why, in 
light of legislative inefficiencies, “the need for administrative agencies is arguably irrefutable”). 
153 The federal APA is found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 501–59 (2012). As indicated earlier, most states 
have their own administrative procedure acts, which are largely modeled on the federal one. See 
Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 300 (1986) 
(“Because most current state APAs are based in whole or in part on the 1946 and the 1961 model 
[state administrative procedure] acts, and those model acts incorporate many general concepts 
embedded in the federal act, the federal APA appears to have had a significant impact on the 
development of state administrative procedure law.”). While local governments, which are 
responsible for most police agencies, are typically exempt from state APAs, they are not necessarily 
immune from the dictates of administrative procedure. See infra text accompanying notes 234–39. 
154 See Steven P. Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and Regulatory Reform: A 
Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 35, 35 (1996) (referring to the APA as “the constitution of the 
modern regulatory state”). 
155 See, e.g., Renan, supra note 138, at 1113-14 (observing that, in the context of surveillance 
technologies, those actually taking collection of the information will be closest to the technology in 
question and to the specific circumstances of the situation). 
156 See infra text accompanying notes 264–95. 
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Before explaining this conclusion, a key predicate question must be 
addressed: why haven’t police agencies been subject to the constraints of 
administrative law already? If the analogy described above is so evident, why 
hasn’t it been formally recognized by commentators or courts? Indeed, to the 
extent the issue has been addressed, the accepted wisdom is directly to the 
contrary. For instance, even though the Administrative Procedure Act does 
not include law enforcement in its exemptions,157 the leading treatise on the 
subject flatly states that “administrative law includes the entire range of action 
by government with respect to the citizen or by the citizen with respect to 
the government, except for those matters dealt with by the criminal law.”158 
David Zaring has noted that, at the federal level, “[t]he DOJ . . . does not 
make policy through the APA. Its important criminal law function is 
regulated by the courts through criminal, rather than administrative, 
procedure.”159 Despite the extensive efforts of well-known scholars such as 
Kenneth Culp Davis and Anthony Amsterdam going back to the early 
1970s,160 police agencies have for the most part remained immune from the 
formal strictures of administrative statutes. Of course, most police 
departments have some regulations, governing everything from use of deadly 
force to traffic stops.161 But none of these rules are required to go through the 
filter of the APA as occurs with other agencies. 
This immunity from regulatory oversight, to the extent it is absolute, is 
illegitimate for three reasons. First, virtually all other public officials have 
always been subject to administrative law. The fact that police are exempt 
appears to be an inadvertent byproduct of judicial constitutional activism and 
our federalist structure rather than a considered policy development. Second, 
despite the Fourth Amendment’s practical preemption of the field, the 
Supreme Court’s cases—in particular, its inspection cases—can be 
interpreted as a command that administrative law governs in the panvasive 
context. And third, even if Fourth Amendment precedent is inapposite in this 
setting, the generalized, prospective nature of panvasive searches and 
seizures, as distinguished from suspicion-based searches and seizures, 
requires that they function consistently with administrative law principles. 
 
157 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012) (exempting Congress, the courts, governments of the territories, 
certain banking functions, and the military from coverage). 
158 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 1.1, at 1 (3d ed. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, New Trends in Administrative 
Law, 6 MD. BAR J. 9, 9 (1974)). 
159 David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187, 239 n.263 (2010). 
160 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
161 See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and 
Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 446 (1990) 
(noting the increase in internal written police policies in the second half of the twentieth century). 
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A. Police and the Development of Administrative Law 
The term “new administrativist” implies, correctly, that regulating police 
through administrative law is not a new idea. As early as 1903, Bruce Wyman 
at Harvard Law School was asserting that police should be subject to the 
constraints of administrative law.162 In his book published that year, The 
Principles of the Administrative Law Governing the Relations of Public Officers, he 
devoted sections to arrest and to seizure of property, and discussed the use of 
force and warrant and cause requirements.163 While he recognized that the 
latter requirements come from the “law of the land,” he saw administrative 
rules as a way to mitigate their effect on officers who acted fairly.164 
Fast forward to the 1970s when scholars such as Davis, Amsterdam, and 
Judge Carl McGowan were advocating for application of administrative law 
principles to the police,165 and several national organizations, including the 
American Bar Association, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 
and the International Association of Chiefs of Police made similar declarations.166 
Probably best known is the work of Davis, who published Police Discretion in 
1975, and an article making similar points the same year.167 Bemoaning the 
fact that police are not governed by “the principles of administrative law,” he 
argued that “administrative law thinking can be profitably applied to criminal 
administration.”168 He went on to make several provocative assertions: 
Five basic facts about police policy are astonishing: (1) Much of it is illegal or 
of doubtful legality. (2) Subordinates at or near the bottom of the organization, 
not top officers, make much of it. (3) Most of it is kept secret from those who 
are affected by it. (4) Police policy is characteristically based on superficial 
guesswork and hardly at all on systematic studies by staffs of qualified 
 
162 See generally BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903). 
163 See id. at 275-80 (discussing arrest and seizure of property); see also id. at 275 (stating that 
an officer “may not use more force than is absolutely necessary”); id. at 276-77 (stating that an arrest 
of a person who turns out to be innocent is nonetheless permissible if founded on probable cause to 
believe a felony has been committed). 
164 See id. at 277 (referring to rules governing police as “true rules of administrative law”). 
165 See supra note 16. 
166 See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4.3, at 19 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1974) (“Police discretion can best be structured and controlled through the process of 
administrative rule-making by police agencies.”); NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS & GOALS, POLICE standard 1.3, at 22 (1973) (“Every police executive should formalize 
procedures for developing and implementing . . . written agency policy.”); MODEL RULES FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS r. 6.10 (INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE 1972) (noting that 
determinations about selective enforcement “should be made only through an established departmental 
administrative rulemaking procedure which provides for citizen participation and judicial review”). 
167 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); Davis, supra note 16. 
168 Davis, supra note 16, at 703. 
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specialists or on investigations like those conducted by our best administrative 
agencies and legislative committees. (5) It is almost completely exempt from 
the kind of limited judicial review deemed necessary for almost all other 
administrative agencies.169 
Davis’s hope was that courts would address this “astonishing” situation 
through administrative law. In particular, he wanted to use administrative 
principles to regulate what he called “selective enforcement,” the exercise of 
discretion in deciding whom to arrest or search among those suspected of 
violating the law.170 
Between these publications of Wyman and Davis came a deluge of laws 
meant to regulate the administrative lawmaking process, triggered in large part 
by concern about the huge discretion wielded by New Deal agencies.171 Congress 
enacted the federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 and, within the next 
few decades, every state followed suit, although their approaches did not always 
mimic the federal statute.172 These administrative procedure acts were meant to 
regularize rulemaking and adjudication by administrative agencies, increase 
agency accountability, ensure an opportunity for public input during agency 
rulemaking deliberations, and reduce, in the federal APA’s words, “arbitrary” and 
“capricious” conduct by the agencies.173 By the time Davis was writing, courts had 
produced a considerable amount of case law exploring the role of the courts in 
ensuring agencies followed these statutes. Davis pointed in particular to Supreme 
Court and lower court decisions that had required agencies to develop 
“ascertainable standards” governing their discretionary actions.174 Although none 
 
169 Id. at 703-04. 
170 See id. at 705 (arguing that “rulemaking can reach all police activities, including the vital 
subject of selective enforcement”). 
171 See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from 
New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1996) (recounting the legislative reaction to New 
Deal legislation). 
172 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.13, at 32-33 (3d ed. 1991) (noting 
that, as of 1991, thirty states and the District of Columbia followed the Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act, which is similar to the federal APA, and twenty other states had similar 
administrative procedure laws); Bonfield, supra note 153, at 297 (noting that the states “adopted many 
of the general concepts embodied in the 1946 federal Administrative Procedure Act”). 
173 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.1, at 29 (3d ed. 2014) (stating that the federal APA “requires that 
rulemaking be participatory and comprehensive” as well as “demonstrably rational”); William Funk, 
Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147, 154-55 (1991) 
(discussing rationality review of agency rulemaking in the states). 
174 Davis, supra note 16, at 708 (quoting Holmes v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d 
Cir. 1968)). Davis also cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974), 
which held that “[t]he agency must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to 
assure that it is being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of 
arbitrary denial . . . to potential beneficiaries.” Davis, supra note 16, at 710. Davis also claimed to 
have collected more than a dozen cases requiring administrative rulemaking. Id. at 709-10. 
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of these cases involved the police, Davis believed they stood for the proposition 
that any administrator, including a police administrator, “violates due process if 
he fails to confine and structure his discretion to the extent required to avoid 
unnecessary arbitrariness in the choices made.”175 
Since Davis wrote, judicially required administrative rulemaking and 
judicial review of those rules have burgeoned.176 Yet, police agencies have 
remained largely unaffected by these developments, and the courts have not 
picked up on Davis’s suggestion. Nor have the arguments of the new 
administrativists fared any better. 
One set of explanations for this void might focus on ways in which the 
function of the police differs from that of other agencies. Arguments along 
these lines would suggest that intermeddling with police work by inexpert 
judges will lead to particularly costly mistakes (including needless loss of life), 
or that police need more speed and flexibility than other public officials and 
therefore cannot be saddled with rulemaking requirements.177 Another concern, 
often voiced by police themselves, is that police decisionmaking requires 
greater secrecy than is typically permitted in an administrative law regime.178 
None of these attempts at distinguishing police agencies from other 
agencies works. Judicial second-guessing of agency decisions can exact 
enormous costs in a host of other settings involving, for instance, pollution, 
food, and health regulations, yet judicial review persists in all of them.179 Speed 
and flexibility are important in connection with any number of executive 
branch activities, ranging from environmental protection to health-related 
matters to financial regulation, and the relevant agencies have managed to 
function despite rulemaking requirements; furthermore, of course, rules can 
account for emergency situations and unforeseen circumstances.180 And any 
 
175 Id. at 708. 
176 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 173, § 3.3 n.28 (citing cases requiring publication of 
general rules of eligibility, entitlement to government benefits, and “articulated standards”). 
177 These concerns, among others, have been associated with other executive endeavors that are not 
subject to administrative control. See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign 
Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1935-46 (2015) (arguing that these and related concerns do not 
justify exempting foreign affairs from the accountability associated with administrative principles). 
178 See Freedom of Information Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 119 (1983) (describing a Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) study finding that the release of training manuals and investigative reports “has apparently 
served to educate and enlighten the criminal element in many of the subtle aspects of DEA’s 
undercover operations, including the use of informants, surveillance techniques, and the technical 
aspects of many of DEA’s more sophisticated investigative techniques”). 
179 See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 177, at 1946 (providing examples, including judicial 
evaluation of agency decisions about clean air, cigarette smoking, and expansion of health care). 
180 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 
and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1636-39 (2009) (noting how, in the 
modern administrative state, the executive and administrative agencies have been “the main crisis 
managers” of national security threats after 9/11 and of the financial meltdown of 2008). 
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police need for secrecy can be accommodated. For instance, the federal APA 
and most state APAs provide that police agencies need not disclose, in the federal 
APA’s words, “techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions, or . . . guidelines for law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk 
circumvention of the law.”181 Note, however, that this provision, which is part 
of the Freedom of Information Act,182 does not exempt police from the rest 
of the APA; rather, it only permits nondisclosure of a “selective enforcement” 
policy, of the type Davis advocated, that would tip off potential criminals 
about whom the police will target. 
In short, nothing about the police function suggests police agencies should be 
treated differently than other agencies. One might nonetheless conjecture two 
other reasons why the police are left alone by administrative jurisprudence. First 
is the fact that most policing in the United States is local. The lion’s share of 
searches and seizures, especially those that are suspicion-based, are carried out by 
municipal and county authorities, not federal agents or state police.183 Yet the 
federal APA applies only to federal agencies, and municipal agencies are not 
necessarily covered by state APAs. Although I argue below that even local police 
agencies usually should be covered by their state’s APA,184 the local nature of 
policing may have stymied easy application of APA-like procedure. 
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, administrative law may have had a 
minimal impact on the police because police regulation has been dominated 
by the Fourth Amendment, at least after Mapp v. Ohio applied the exclusionary 
rule to the states.185 Since that 1961 decision, the Supreme Court has handed 
down hundreds of opinions with nationwide application on the warrant 
requirement and its exceptions,186 the definitions of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion,187 and the application of the exclusionary rule.188 
Probably no other type of agency work is so heavily surrounded by 
constitutional doctrine. The ubiquity and scope of this jurisprudence make it 
easy to assume that the Fourth Amendment—along with the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments—has occupied the field of police regulation. 
 
181 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2012). 
182 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
183 ROY ROBERG, KENNETH NOVAK & GARY CORDNER, POLICE & SOCIETY 16 (4th ed. 
2008) (“Local police, when compared with state and federal law enforcement, have the most 
employees, cost the most money, respond to a majority of police-related problems, and tend to have 
a closer relationship with citizens.”). 
184 See infra text accompanying notes 234–39. 
185 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
186 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2007). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
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The fact remains that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has left 
considerable room for experimentation. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized as much in a series of cases, all of which involve panvasive actions. 
B. Supreme Court Case Law Redux 
A clear goal of all of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases is to 
avoid anything smacking of the “general warrant,” the term used to describe 
government authorizations that give complete discretion to officers in the 
field, and the one type of government action that every court and scholar 
agrees is barred by the amendment.189 The traditional antidote to the general 
warrant is the specific warrant, describing with particularity the person or 
items for which the government has suspicion.190 There are good historical 
and normative reasons for ensuring that the specific warrant, or at least some 
sort of ex ante determination of suspicion, is the default protection against 
infringements on interests that are clearly fundamental; as I have argued 
elsewhere, these fundamental interests would include the ransacking of 
homes, investigatory detentions and arrests of individuals, and certain other 
particularly intrusive government actions.191 But these reasons usually do not 
apply in the panvasive cases addressed by the courts, and some regulatory 
mechanism other than the specific warrant can be contemplated. Several of the 
passages in these cases suggest—although admittedly they do not hold—that 
the mechanism should be administrative law. 
A largely unnoticed aspect of the Supreme Court’s business inspection 
cases is that many of them reference administrative law principles and appear 
to incorporate them as Fourth Amendment requirements. For instance, in 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Court stated that, to protect business owners 
from the “unbridled discretion [of] executive and administrative officers,” the 
judiciary must ensure that there are “reasonable legislative or administrative 
standards for conducting an inspection . . . with respect to a particular 
 
189 See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 583 (1999) (“No one questions that the Framers despised and sought to ban general warrants.”). 
190 See Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1253 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“To 
prevent the issue of general warrants . . . the Framers established the inviolable principle that . . . 
‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the . . . things to 
be seized.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV)). 
191 Slobogin, supra note 136, at 1738-42. In making this argument, I rely on both JOHN HART 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980), and BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). In particular, Ackerman’s “constitutional 
moments” thesis is useful in explaining why, even if legislatively approved, nonfacilitative panvasive 
searches of the home and seizures of people are unconstitutional. See ACKERMAN, supra; cf. Riley v. 
California, 135 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (holding that searches of cell phones require a warrant); 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (prohibiting dragnet seizures). 
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[establishment].”192 In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court upheld a mine inspection 
program because the statute  
requires inspection of all mines and specifically defines the frequency of 
inspection. . . . [T]he standards with which a mine operator is required to 
comply are all specifically set forth in the [Mine Safety] Act or in . . . the Code 
of Federal Regulations. . . . [R]ather than leaving the frequency and purpose of 
inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government officers, the [program] 
establishes a predictable and guided federal regulatory presence.193  
Even in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, perhaps the least fulsome 
opinion in this category of cases, the Court said, in the course of authorizing 
warrantless inspections of liquor stores, “Where Congress has authorized 
inspection but made no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must 
follow, the Fourth Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply.”194 These 
various statements indicate that administrative law can perform the 
Constitution’s regulatory function if the legislature or agency in fact promulgates 
constraining rules.195 They also suggest that if the agency does develop such rules, 
it has established a safe harbor from aggressive judicial intervention. 
The Court’s cases outside the inspection context do not make similar 
explicit reference to administrative regulation. But, as Part I made clear, most 
of the Court’s panvasive search and seizure cases resonate with the inspection 
cases in their insistence on regularization, either through standardized 
procedures, control by superiors, or both. More specifically, one can glean 
from the Court’s panvasive search and seizure cases—including those outside 
the inspection setting—the goal of avoiding four overlapping types of 
government abuse: (1) capricious searches and seizures that are based on 
inarticulate hunches or whim rather than neutral criteria; (2) biased searches 
and seizures, based on irrelevant criteria associated with discriminatory abuse 
or simple malice; (3) pretextual searches and seizures that use the program as 
an excuse for action in the absence of individualized suspicion; and (4) ultra 
vires searches and seizures that go beyond the original investigative purpose 
of the search or seizure (sometimes called “mission creep”). 
For instance, the Court’s checkpoint cases censure “random” stops and 
stops based on arbitrary grounds,196 and the Court’s drug testing decisions 
 
192 436 U.S. 307, 320, 323 (1978) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
193 452 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1981). 
194 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). 
195 See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (“In the context of a regulatory 
inspection system of business premises that is carefully limited in time, place, and scope, the legality 
of the search depends not on consent but on the authority of a valid statute.”). 
196 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39, 44 (2000) (affirming Prouse’s holding 
declaiming “standardless and unconstrained discretion” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
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and King’s holding about DNA stress the limited discretion afforded 
government officials in those cases.197 Likewise, Patel explained its decision 
requiring precompliance review of nonconsensual hotel registry searches as a 
hedge against harassment.198 Patel also suggested such review would curb 
pretextual actions.199 Several other Court opinions, including Edmond, have 
declared that pretext arguments must be entertained in the panvasive search 
and seizure context, in direct contrast to the rule when the avowed reason for 
a search and seizure is individualized suspicion.200 And concern about mission 
creep is reflected in the Court’s emphasis in its drug testing cases that the 
blood samples be used only for determining impairment,201 and its 
assumption in King that DNA samples do not reveal genetic traits and are 
unlikely to disclose private medical information.202 
Given the Court’s concern about abuses of discretion, why hasn’t it 
contemplated resorting to administrative law outside of a subset of its 
inspection cases? Perhaps it is easier to think of searches and seizures of 
businesses as an administrative endeavor because they occur pursuant to 
statute and are carried out by officials who are not police. But neither aspect 
of inspections distinguishes them from other panvasive actions. Federal 
 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979))); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
558-59 (1976) (reiterating that “random roving-patrol stops [cannot] be tolerated because they ‘would 
subject the residents of . . . [border] areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the 
highways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers.’” (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975))). 
197 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (“[I]n light of the 
standardized nature of the [drug] tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with 
administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.”); see also 
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013) (quoting Skinner). 
198 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452-53 (2015) (“Absent an opportunity 
for precompliance review, the ordinance creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will 
exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators and their guests.”). 
199 Id. 
200 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (distinguishing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), 
which prohibits pretext arguments when the police can justify the search and seizure on 
individualized suspicion, from roadblock scenarios where no suspicion exists); see also New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987) (emphasizing that the statute was not enacted “as a ‘pretext’ to 
enable law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law violations”); South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (stating that “there is no suggestion whatever that this standard 
procedure . . . was a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive”). Whren itself recognized the 
distinction. See 517 U.S. at 811 (distinguishing Whren from Burger and Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 
(1987), by noting that the latter involved searches “conducted in the absence of probable cause”). 
201 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 n.7 (“While this procedure permits the Government to 
learn certain private medical facts that an employee might prefer not to disclose, there is no 
indication that the Government . . . uses the information for any other purpose. Under the 
circumstances, we do not view this procedure as a significant invasion of privacy.”). 
202 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasizing that “the CODIS loci come from noncoding parts 
of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee”). 
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regulations were the basis for the drug testing program in Skinner,203 a state 
law established the DNA program in King,204 and local legislation often 
authorizes camera surveillance and other types of panvasive actions.205 
Immigration officials were in charge of the checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte,206 
and school officials supervised the drug tests in Vernonia.207 The DNA 
sampling and testing in King were carried out by correctional officials.208 
Perhaps the judicial intuition is the slightly different notion that businesses 
are “pervasively regulated,” whereas private citizens are not. But even if this 
were true (it turns out to be an interesting question),209 this distinction 
supports an argument for less protection for businesses than for individuals, not 
more. Yet it is only in panvasive cases involving businesses that the Court 
explicitly recognizes the relevance of statutory and administrative regulation. 
If such regulation is necessary in the inspection cases, it ought to be the 
minimum requirement in all other panvasive search and seizure cases. 
C. The Structure of Administrative Law and of Policing 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedent lays important 
groundwork for the argument that administrative law principles are relevant 
to panvasive searches and seizures. However, that precedent does not 
establish what those principles might look like. Either explicitly or implicitly, 
many of the Supreme Court’s decisions have referenced administrative law 
principles such as regularization and discretion-reduction in analyzing how 
the Fourth Amendment applies in the panvasive setting. But the fact remains 
that none of these cases, not even the inspection decisions, mentions the APA 
or analogous statutes, or the law construing or expanding upon those statutes. 
Nor, as noted earlier, have these statutes typically been viewed as applicable 
to the police.210 
 
203 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608 (citing regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad 
Administration, at 49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(1) (1987), as the law governing the drug testing program). 
204 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967 (citing the Maryland DNA Collection Act, MD. CODE ANN., 
PUB. SAFETY § 2–504(a)(3)(i) (Lexis 2011), as the law governing the testing program). 
205 See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CCTV: DEVELOPING PRIVACY BEST PRACTICES 
6 (2007) (recounting the practices of several cities and towns regarding camera surveillance); see also 
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34 (noting that the roadblock program was established by the city of 
Indianapolis); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (indicating that the local 
school board established the school drug test policy). 
206 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545-46 (1976). 
207 515 U.S. at 650. 
208 See 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (stating that “booking personnel” took the buccal swab in King’s case). 
209 See Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy’s Problem, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1079, 
1096 (1995) (“[T]he logic of Burger [(the junkyard inspection case)] can be extended to automobiles 
or, indeed, to almost anything else. After all, there is no constitutional right to sidewalks; in 
principle, walking on sidewalks could be treated as a highly regulated activity.” (footnote omitted)). 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 157–61. 
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This is an oversight, but it is understandable, given traditional views on 
how the police function interacts with the structure of administrative law. The 
APA categorizes agency actions into four types.211 Formal rules are rules that 
the governing statute requires the agency to produce through a trial-like 
proceeding.212 An informal rule is any other “agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or 
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency.”213 Formal adjudication, like formal rulemaking, 
is also provided for by statute and allows for resolution of disputes under 
agency rules through a quasi-judicial process, akin to a trial.214 Finally, 
informal adjudication consists of virtually any other agency action, whether 
it involves allocation of resources, promises, threats, negotiation, or, most 
important here, investigation.215 Unlike the other three categories, the APA 
imposes “few, if any, requirements on informal adjudication” and, indeed, 
“barely acknowledges the concept.”216 Ed Rubin has argued that informal 
adjudication is more accurately labeled simply “executive action.”217 
Traditional, suspicion-based searches and seizures—including decisions 
that selectively enforce criminal statutes in the way that concerned Davis—fit 
most readily into the latter box. Such actions do not have “general effect” like 
a rule does, but rather are akin to informal executive branch “adjudication,” 
either by a police officer or a magistrate. The typical decision about whether 
there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest, search, stop, or frisk 
an individual is a case-specific determination.218 If this is the type of police 
work at issue, it is not surprising that the APA would not be considered 
applicable. That is not to say that this type of police work should be exempt 
from administrative oversight,219 only that such oversight is not required by 
 
211 See The Federal Administrative Procedure Act: Codification or Reform?, 56 YALE L.J. 670, 705 (1947). 
212 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (defining a formal rule as one “required by statute to be made 
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”). 
213 Id. § 551(4). 
214 Id. § 554(a). 
215 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5, at 156 (4th ed. 
2002) (stating that informal adjudications constitute “the largest class of federal agency actions” and 
providing examples). 
216 Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 108 (2003). 
217 Id. at 109. 
218 See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 94 (1979) (“Where the standard is probable cause, a 
search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that 
person . . . . The ‘narrow scope’ of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less 
than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked . . . .”). 
219 Cf. Friedman & Stein, supra note 1, at 285-86 (arguing for administrative rulemaking across 
the board); see also infra text accompanying notes 313–14. 
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the current APA framework, which generally gives a wide berth to 
enforcement actions by agencies.220 
In contrast, a panvasive search and seizure program—establishing 
checkpoints, drug testing, inspections, and the like—is best viewed as the 
kind of general, prospective directive established by administrative rules. As 
defined at the beginning of this Article and fleshed out since, panvasive 
searches and seizures are based on a policy, aimed at groups, and, most 
importantly, applicable despite the complete absence of particularized 
suspicion concerning the people affected.221 To use language often associated 
with administrative rulemaking, such programs directly affect “individual 
rights and obligations,” such as driving, going to school, and using banks.222 
Because they impose costs on legitimate activities unmediated through an 
officer’s judgment about individual wrongdoing, panvasive searches and 
seizures differ from suspicion-based policing in the same way that rulemaking 
differs from adjudication. Thus, these interventions should only be permitted 
if they are subject to the vetting and procedural restrictions that apply to 
other agency rulemaking. 
An administrative law buff might nonetheless object that panvasive police 
policies do not fit the commonly accepted paradigm of legislative rulemaking. 
Typically, an agency rule is legislative only if it tells private citizens and 
companies what they may and may not do.223 One might argue that search and 
seizure policies are more aptly described, in administrative law parlance, as 
“internal” or “housekeeping” rules—rules that govern agency operatives224—or 
“interpretive rules”—rules that spell out an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
or court ruling225—neither of which are subject to the same degree of regulation 
as legislative rules. 
Even assuming these distinctions are coherent,226 once again they justify, 
at most, exempting suspicion-based searches and seizures from the APA’s 
 
220 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985) (“The agency is far better equipped than 
the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”). 
221 See supra text accompanying notes 5–6. 
222 See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 172-73 (2007) (associating 
notice-and-comment rulemaking with a regulation that “directly governs the conduct of members 
of the public, ‘affecting individual rights and obligations’” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281, 302 (1979))); see also infra note 228. 
223 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 172, at 5 (noting that regulatory agencies are vested with 
“authority to prescribe generally what shall or shall not be done” in ways that “impinge upon private 
rights and regulate the manner in which those rights may be exercised”). 
224 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012) (excluding from coverage “matter[s] relating to agency 
management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts”). 
225 See id. § 553(b)(3) (“[T]his subsection does not apply . . . to interpretative rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice . . . .”). 
226 But see David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short 
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278-79 (2010) (“There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in the field of 
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purview. In the suspicion-based search and seizure setting, the relevant legal 
rules are concededly aimed at the police; the obligations imposed on private 
citizens come not from those rules but from criminal statutes. As long as 
citizens obey the criminal law, or at least do not arouse suspicion that they 
are violating that law, they may not be subjected to a search or seizure. The 
restrictions imposed by the probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
requirements, in turn, are meant to speak to the police about when they may 
enforce the criminal law, and thus any rule that the police devise to operationalize 
these requirements could plausibly be said to be internal or interpretive.227 
In contrast, panvasive search and seizure policies are like statutes that 
directly regulate the public. In these regimes, citizens are told they must 
submit to an inspection, checkpoint, or drug testing program or expose their 
information to the government, not because a criminal statute says so—citizens 
cannot avoid a panvasive search and seizure even if they completely abjure 
suspicious behavior—but because the panvasive policy dictates it. While the 
policy also governs the police, it is directed at the public. 
In short, unlike internal or interpretive rules, panvasive search and seizure 
policies prospectively affect the “rights and obligations” of the citizenry,228 both 
individually and as a group. In fact, they do so to a much greater extent than 
many other policies that are considered “rules” under the APA. For instance, 
the APA requires that agencies abide by its rulemaking dictates when dealing 
with such matters as workplace ergonomics, the height of a fence around 
animals, and the precise manner in which farm yields are reported.229 A regime 
 
administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between legislative and 
nonlegislative rules. . . . [C]ourts have labeled the distinction . . . ‘tenuous,’ ‘baffling,’ and 
‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’”). Criticism of this lax treatment of internal rules has been robust 
even in the typical administrative context. See Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” 
Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 4 (1994) (noting the frequent 
criticisms of the distinctions as ‘fuzzy’ or ‘enshrouded in considerable fog’”). 
227 Indeed, Davis himself thought that selective enforcement rules should probably be 
classified as “interpretive rules,” see DAVIS, supra note 167, at 110, which, as noted above, supra note 
225 and accompanying text, are rules that state what the administrative officer thinks the statute or 
regulation means and are exempt from notice-and-comment requirements. See also Friedman & 
Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1857 (“For the most part, police rules are internal—they simply 
instruct police officers how they must go about enforcing the laws already in place. Rules contained 
in a police manual may be binding on individual officers, but the police are not permitted to make 
members of the general public do (or abstain from doing) anything not already written into the 
substantive law.” (footnote omitted)). 
228 See Davidson v. Glickman, 169 F.3d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Interpretive rules state what 
the administrative officer thinks the statute or regulation means, while legislative rules ‘affect[] 
individual rights and obligations’ and create law.” (citations omitted)). 
229 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 211-13 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a directive regarding workplace ergonomics and the handling of materials in certain types 
of industries was not a mere “procedural rule” or “general statement of policy” exempt from APA 
notice-and-comment requirements, but rather a substantive rule, before promulgation of which the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration was required to conduct a notice-and-comment 
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that requires the relevant agency to submit to administrative law constraints in 
these situations, but not when police want to require citizens to submit to drug 
testing, checkpoints, and surveillance, is seriously askew. 
Taken together, the history and rationale of administrative law, allusions 
in the Court’s inspection cases, and the structure of panvasive actions support 
the proposition that, when carrying out such actions, police ought to be 
governed by administrative law. At the same time, as the Supreme Court 
suggested in Colonnade, a rule that has cleared the relevant administrative law 
hurdles might provide a constitutional safe harbor230—a domain in which 
police deserve to exercise discretion because they have followed a process for 
limiting it. The remainder of this Article fleshes out what these hurdles might 
be and how they might function in the panvasive setting. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A VEHICLE FOR  
REGULATING THE POLICE 
On the assumption that administrative law principles should apply to 
panvasive actions administered by police agencies just as it would to other 
government agencies, this Part will use the Administrative Procedure Act and 
subsequent judicial interpretations of its application at the federal level as the 
template for discussing the types of restrictions that administrative law might 
place on panvasive police actions. The APA, as amended, has three central 
objectives: (1) to subject agency actions to public scrutiny; (2) to establish 
requirements for rulemaking and adjudication; and (3) to provide a method 
of challenging agency action in court on constitutional or statutory grounds, 
including claims that the APA itself has been violated.231 The courts and 
Congress have added significant gloss to the APA, particularly with respect 
to judicial review of agency actions and legislative or executive overview of 
 
rulemaking proceeding); see also Davidson, 169 F.3d at 999 (finding that a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
handbook provision regarding the method of reporting use of farm acreage affected individual rights 
and thus qualified as a legislative rule that required notice and comment); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
82 F.3d 165, 1771-72 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Department of Agriculture guidance regulating fence 
height for “dangerous” animals was a legislative rule requiring notice-and-comment procedure); Cmty. 
Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (concluding that Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) action levels for contaminants were legislative rules subject to notice-and-comment 
requirements); Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, No. 10-1941, 2010 WL 4116892, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) 
(finding that a notice to lessees and operators of mobile offshore drilling units setting forth new safety 
measures for oil rigs was a substantive rule that required notice and comment). 
230 See Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970); see also supra text 
accompanying note 194. A few scholars have recognized that good faith legislative or administrative 
attempts to solve a problem might be treated as a safe harbor against constitutional attack. See, e.g., 
Rappaport, supra note 138, at 208 (“[T]he Court could offer a ‘safe harbor’ of relaxed constitutional 
scrutiny to jurisdictions that voluntarily adopt and comply with reforms . . . .”). 
231 See Rubin, supra note 216, at 100-01 (setting forth these three aims of the regime established 
by the APA). 
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those actions.232 The most pertinent aspects of this body of law for panvasive 
police conduct are the notice-and-comment requirement, the requirement 
that rules be adequately explained in writing, the requirement that rules be 
implemented evenhandedly, and the requirement that rules not exceed the 
relevant legislative authorization.233 
One caveat to the notion that administrative law principles such as these 
ought to apply to the police is that the majority of police departments are 
municipal, local entities,234 yet most municipalities are not governed by APA-like 
statutes.235 Further, even if they were governed by such a statute, many of 
these municipalities run small departments that might have great difficulty 
constructing and explaining rules, as required by notice-and-comment and 
other administrative procedure mandates.236 
The latter problem can largely be addressed by allowing smaller departments 
to piggyback on policies developed by their larger counterparts and other policy 
organs.237 The first objection is more substantial, but not fatal. Not only should 
federal, state, and county police be governed by the relevant APA, but municipal 
police departments should be as well, at least to the extent they are carrying out 
panvasive actions in service of state or federal criminal law rather than a purely 
local statute; under those circumstances they are functioning like an agency of 
those entities.238 That would mean that, even if carried out by local authorities, 
checkpoints aimed at drug and alcohol interdiction, most drug testing 
programs, many inspection programs, and most surveillance would be governed 
by the notice-and-comment, explanation, implementation, and authorization 
requirements discussed here.239 
 
232 See generally infra text accompanying notes 264–95. 
233 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 173, at 37-39, 445-49 (explaining the first two components); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 282, 296–97 (explaining the last two components). 
234 Of the approximately 18,000 law enforcement agencies, almost 13,000 are local, rather than 
county, state, or federal. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 63 (8th ed. 2013). 
235 Note, however, that the biggest cities usually have such statutes. E.g., N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 
45, §§ 1041–47 (2004). 
236 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1886-89 (noting that almost half of 
American police departments have fewer than ten full-time officers, and describing the difficulty of 
imposing administrative rulemaking obligations on a small municipal police force). 
237 For instance, the Constitution Project has developed detailed guidelines for the fusion 
centers and camera systems discussed later in this Article. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra 
note 86; see also infra notes 241–44 and accompanying text. 
238 Further, in at least nine states, municipalities are considered agencies of the state. See 1 
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2.8.10 (3d ed. 1999) (“[A 
municipal corporation] is variously described as an arm of the state, a miniature state, an 
instrumentality of the state, an agency of the state, and the like.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). 
239 Residential and business inspections are the one major exception; such inspections 
generally stem from local ordinances rather than state or federal policy. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. 
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (involving a routine inspection for possible violations of San Francisco’s 
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In the following survey of how these requirements would apply to 
panvasive searches and seizures, three sorts of modern programs—involving 
physical surveillance, datamining, and physical seizures—can serve as 
illustrations of how they might play out in practice. The first type of program 
is well-represented by the Domain Awareness operation that has existed in 
New York City since 2012.240 Among other things, this brainchild of the New 
York Police Department and Microsoft endeavors to collate and provide to 
officers in the field information about public activities gleaned from 
thousands of surveillance cameras, geospatial data that reveals crime “hot 
spots,” feeds from license recognition systems, and GPS signals that permit 
real-time and historical tracking of cars.241 Domain Awareness is 
representative of numerous other types of physical monitoring systems, 
including a recent surge in wide-ranging drone surveillance.242 The second 
type of program—known as the “fusion center”—exists in well over half of 
the states, and uses computers to collect financial, rental, utility, vehicle, and 
communications data from federal, state, and local public databases, law 
enforcement files, and private companies in an effort to identify suspicious 
individuals or provide information on already-identified suspects.243 Fusion 
centers are, in essence, junior versions of the NSA metadata program and 
similar federal record-collection efforts.244 The third illustrative program, 
representative of panvasive seizures rather than searches, is a discontinued 
District of Columbia police department “Neighborhood Safety Zone” policy 
permitting checkpoints at roads leading into neighborhoods thought to be 
experiencing extreme violence, at which drivers were asked why they wanted 
 
Housing Code). Although efforts to combat local crime are burgeoning, they tend to be 
implemented through suspicion-based policing. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of 
Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1416-19 (2001) (describing the increasing use of 
criminal law by cities and towns). 
240 See Colleen Long, NYPD, Microsoft Create Crime-Fighting Tech System, YAHOO! NEWS (Feb. 
20, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/news/nypd-microsoft-create-crime-fighting-tech-system-174310276
—finance.html?ref=gs [https://perma.cc/T43E-Q5T5] (describing New York City’s Domain 
Awareness System). 
241 Id.; see also New York Police Department, Public Security Privacy Guidelines (Apr. 2, 2009), 
www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/crime_prevention/public_security_privacy_guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NA8D-MS26] [hereinafter Guidelines] (describing the contours and legal 
authority for the program). 
242 On the increase in drone surveillance and attempts to regulate it, see generally Marc 
Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph Thai, Regulating Drones Under the 
First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015). 
243 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUSION CENTERS: 
PRESERVING PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST CRIME & TERRORISM 
4 (2012), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/fusioncenterreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D3K-
HXXH] (describing the establishment of seventy-seven fusion centers nationwide and the types of 
information these centers collect). 
244 See id. (discussing the role of fusion centers). 
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to enter the neighborhood and could be denied entrance if the police decided 
their reason was not “legitimate.”245 
An initial issue is how these programs prospectively affect individual 
rights and obligations in a way that triggers the administrative rulemaking 
process. While the answer to that question is clear with respect to the stops 
that occurred under the D.C. program, given a roadblock’s interference with 
autonomy,246 it may not be as obvious in connection with the two surveillance 
programs. Channeling the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases,247 one 
could argue that those panvasive programs affect no important interests 
because they neither physically intrude on nor directly coerce citizens; they 
simply collect information, usually from publicly available sources. But the 
fact remains that, like a roadblock policy, a surveillance program influences 
people’s legitimate activities. To avoid the impact of such a program, one 
would have to sacrifice traveling in numerous public spaces and engaging in 
many public and private transactions; since such activities are usually 
unavoidable, the more likely outcome is that the existence of surveillance will 
modify how those activities are carried out.248 Thus, the Domain Awareness 
and fusion center programs do affect those subject to surveillance, even 
though no physical intrusion or direct coercion is involved.249 
A. Notice and Comment 
Under the APA, if an agency engages in informal rulemaking, it must 
issue a generally available notice of “either the terms or substance of the 
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.”250 The goal 
is to permit public comment on the proposed rule or rule change, and thereby 
 
245 Maria Glod, Federal Courts Say D.C. Police Checkpoints Were Unconstitutional, WASH. POST 
(July 11, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/10/AR200907100
2750.html [https://perma.cc/68MV-D9R7]. 
246 See Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating, in the 
course of assessing the constitutionality of the D.C. program, that “roadside checkpoints, however 
brief, intrude on motorists’ ‘right of “free passage without interruption”’ and ‘arguably on their right 
to personal security’” (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1976))), 
rev’d, 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
247 See supra note 8. 
248 Cf. Sean Gallagher, Mall Owners Pull Plug on Cellular Tracking (For Now), WIRED (Nov. 29, 
2011, 11:11 AM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/11/mall-pull-plug-cell-tracking [https://
perma.cc/5DJN-TA8W] (describing the outcry over and eventual termination of a program that 
used cell phone signals to track the activities of shoppers, with Senator Charles Schumer objecting 
that people could only opt out of the tracking by turning off their cell phones). 
249 For more discussion of how surveillance influences the public’s behavior and how this 
influence relates to standing issues, see Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42 
PEPP. L. REV. 517, 530-44 (2015), which provides several reasons why “chilling” arguments should 
lead to Article III standing. 
250 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012). 
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improve the agency’s decisionmaking process and enhance political 
legitimacy.251 Case law establishes that if the agency fails to pinpoint critical 
issues covered by the proposed rule and identified in comments, any regulation 
that results can be challenged in court and nullified.252 
Application of this rule in the panvasive search and seizure setting could 
not but help democratize the process. As Eric Miller has written, unlike the 
rulemaking of other agencies, 
police rulemaking is most often not open to [the] public . . . . The resulting 
policy is often based solely on [the police’s] own internal assessment of the 
appropriate goals and values to pursue, independent of the interests of the 
community they police. Departmental policy-makers thus remain remote from 
the community, looking inwards rather than outwards to determine the 
proposed policy’s social and criminological impact. Given this feature of police 
policy-making, community members lack the ability to participate in—and 
especially, to challenge—police policy at the front-end during the equivalent of 
the drafting and comment process.253 
Consistent with these observations, programs like Domain Awareness, fusion 
centers, and neighborhood blockades are often simply sprung on the public,254 
or in the case of at least some fusion centers, never formally presented to the 
public at all.255 Nor were most of the panvasive policies involved in the Supreme 
Court’s cases subject to any type of pre-initiation debate.256 
Application of the APA would have a dramatic impact on the usual 
cloistered police policymaking process.257 For instance, despite numerous 
 
251 See Rubin, supra note 216, at 113 (“The entire point of the comment process is to effect changes 
in the proposed rule. Agency rulemaking is a policy process that should involve the collection of new 
information and the use of that information to design optimal solutions.” (footnote omitted)). 
252 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (enjoining the 
Department of Labor from adopting a new rule because the Secretary failed to comply with the 
notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act). 
253 Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 522-23 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
254 See, e.g., Long, supra note 240 (quoting the director of the NYPD counterterrorism program as 
stating that the domain awareness program “was created by cops for cops” and remarking that “the latest 
version has been quietly in use for about a year”); see also Glod, supra note 245 (indicating that residents 
were surprised and upset by the roadblock in the Trinidad neighborhood of Washington, D.C.). 
255 Cf. Slobogin, supra note 136, at 1751 (stating that, in most jurisdictions where fusion centers 
operate, “no local legislative body has debated the purpose or scope of fusion-center operation”). 
256 There were some exceptions, however. For instance, the school district in Vernonia 
presented the proposed drug testing policy at a “parent input” night, where the parents who were 
in attendance gave unanimous approval. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-650 
(1995). More common is the process in Sitz, where a task force composed of police, prosecutors, and 
state transportation department officials created the policy without public consultation. Mich. Dep’t 
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 
257 Miller is pessimistic about the capacity of the notice-and-comment procedure to encourage 
full public participation. See Miller, supra note 253, at 548 (“[Notice and comment] does little, on its 
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news stories about domain awareness programs and fusion centers, we still do 
not know the extent to which New York City is keeping tabs on its citizens, 
or the precise types of records (such as bank accounts, medical documents, 
communication logs?) that fusion centers are compiling.258 Requiring a 
notice-and-comment period or something like it would mandate transparency 
about these types of issues and at least a patina of democratic participation.259 
In particular, it could provide concrete testimony about what Jane Bambauer 
has called the “hassle” associated with panvasive programs—the extent to 
which a program will affect innocent members of the public in its efforts to 
catch bad actors.260 
A perennial concern of the police—and one reason their rulemaking is so 
secretive—is that knowledge of their tactics will tip off criminals and 
undermine crime detection efforts; indeed, as noted earlier, the APA itself 
accommodates police in this respect.261 But in the panvasive context, this 
concern is highly exaggerated. First, of course, the primary aim of panvasive 
search and seizure programs such as roadblocks, drug testing, and inspections 
 
own . . . . What more is needed is to have the community actually participate, and have the 
institution take them seriously . . . .”). Others are concerned that the feedback it produces will come 
too late in the process. See Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police 
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 404 (2010) 
(suggesting that information obtained in the notice-and-comment period would be more valuable 
before any proposed rule was formulated). But some participation is better than none, and agencies 
are not prevented from revising rules after receiving comments. Erik Luna laid out the basic 
chronology as “(1) preparation of enforcement principles, (2) publication and invitation for comments, 
(3) public deliberation in an open forum, (4) revision based on the comments, (5) publication of the 
final principles, and (6) inculcation of the principles among rank-and-file officers.” Luna, supra note 
138, at 603-04. 
258 See, e.g., Torin Monahan & Neal A. Palmer, The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers, 40 
SECURITY DIALOGUE 617, 630 (2009) (quoting one fusion center trainer as saying, “If people knew 
what we were looking at, they’d throw a fit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
259 A formal notice-and-comment procedure may not be required before promulgation of 
many panvasive policies. See William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 
78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61-62 (2015) (noting that the overriding goal sought by 
administrative principles is bureaucratic transparency, rather than adherence to formal process). 
Further, it would make no sense to require such a procedure before every particular panvasive action. 
For instance, a departmental decision to deploy extra officers at a given location or the siting of a 
particular roadblock should be consistent with an ex ante policy and should be subject to ex post 
review on antidiscrimination grounds, see infra text accompanying notes 282–94, but could of course 
take place without a notice-and-comment period. 
260 See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461, 464 (2015) (defining “hassle” as “the 
chance that the police will stop or search an innocent person against his will”); cf. Martin Kaste, In 
‘Domain Awareness,’ Detractors See Another NSA, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 21, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/02/21/280749781/in-domain-awareness-detractors-
see-another-nsa [https://perma.cc/J6CZ-NCDM] (describing controversy over Oakland’s domain 
awareness program, the nature of which was initially hidden from the public, and noting that the 
program may be scaled back as a result). 
261 See supra text accompanying note 181. 
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is deterrence, which publicity can only enhance. Second, matters of specific 
implementation need not be disclosed. For instance, if camera surveillance is 
meant to be covert, the fact and general area of such surveillance should be 
disclosed, but exact camera locations need not be. Similarly, the types of 
records sought by fusion centers should be revealed, but the algorithms that 
might be used to analyze them need not be. And only the approximate 
number and location of inspection checks or drug tests, not their precise 
timing, would have to be revealed to the public. Third, and most importantly, 
police should have to accept the fact that they function in a democracy.262 
Democratic accountability—a key value sought to be implemented by 
administrative law—requires that the public be told not only what panvasive 
capacities police have, but also how those capacities will be used.263 
B. Explanation of the Policy 
A much discussed issue in administrative law circles is the extent to which 
an agency must take public comments into consideration and, when it does 
not follow the route suggested by a comment, explain why it failed to do so.264 
The APA does not require a response to every comment; demanding that an 
agency answer all of the submissions it receives, regardless of coherence or 
number, would be inefficient and unproductive.265 At the same time, the APA 
does state that agency rules and their underlying findings may not be 
“arbitrary” or “capricious.”266 
The Supreme Court’s solution to this dilemma has been to require a 
written rationale for rules the agency promulgates, and require as well that 
the rationale link the agency’s evidence, policies, and actions in a cogent 
way.267 Thus, courts are entitled to ensure that agencies have taken a “hard 
look” at the rules they generate. As Kevin Stack states: 
 
262 See DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 157-58 (2008) (defending 
the idea that policing practices and fundamental aspects of democracy are irretrievably linked). 
263 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1832 (“It is both unacceptable and unwise for 
policing to remain aloof from the democratic processes that apply to the rest of agency government.”). 
264 See Rubin, supra note 216, at 115-17 (discussing the difficulty courts face in defining which 
comments an agency must respond to when rulemaking). 
265 The APA requires that the rules incorporate “a concise general statement of [their] basis 
and purpose,” Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n v. Envtl. Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324, 
1330 (Wyo. 1979), but the agency need not discuss “every item or factor or opinion in the submissions 
made to it,” SCHWARTZ, supra note 172, at 200-01. 
266 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing reviewing courts to “set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law”). 
267 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (emphasizing that an agency must set 
forth the basis for each rule “with such clarity as to be understandable”); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983) (“We have frequently reiterated that 
an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner . . . .”). 
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Under the leading formulation of [the hard look] doctrine, “the agency must 
examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the 
choices made.’” The court “consider[s] whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error 
of judgment.” In addition, the agency may not “entirely fail[] to consider an 
important aspect of the problem,” may not “offer[] an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency,” nor offer an 
explanation that is “so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference 
in view or the product of agency expertise.” The agency must also relate the 
factual findings and expected effects of the regulation to the purposes or goals 
the agency must consider under the statute as well as respond to salient 
criticisms of the agency’s reasoning.268 
Note that the hard look standard does not require an agency to 
demonstrate a “compelling” state interest nor does it allow a court to second 
guess executive choices among alternatives; thus, it is not as demanding as 
strict scrutiny analysis. But, just as clearly, hard look analysis is not equivalent 
to the minimal rationality review applicable in cases involving economic 
legislation.269 Rather, it is meant to endorse a tougher stance, perhaps akin to 
the constitutional standard known as “rationality with bite,”270 on the ground 
that executive agents are not popularly elected or imbued with supreme 
legislative authority, but rather appointed officials who are restrained by 
legislative policy.271 
Thus, the hard look standard stands in stark contrast to the Court’s 
current “soft look” special needs jurisprudence. As applied to panvasive 
searches and seizures, hard look doctrine would be less deferential to 
government programs because it would require a greater demonstration of 
effectiveness at crime reduction than the Court’s special needs cases do. For 
instance, the drug testing program of customs agents upheld in Von Raab 
would have failed hard look analysis, because there was virtually no evidence 
 
268 Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 378-79 (2012) (second, 
third, and fourth alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
269 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the 
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2008) (“Traditional rational basis 
review only asks whether any theoretical, or hypothesized, rational relationship exists to a legitimate 
governmental interest; the challenger must essentially prove a negative by eliminating any real or 
imagined basis for the enactment. By way of contrast, under ‘rationality with bite,’ the government 
bears the burden of establishing the actual reason for the law that would be advanced by applying 
the law . . . .”). 
270 Id. 
271 See Stack, supra note 268, at 379 (“Hard-look review further distinguishes regulations from 
legislation; it has long been understood as requiring a higher standard of rationality than the 
minimum rational basis standard of constitutional review.”). 
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of a problem to be solved.272 A similar conclusion could easily have been 
drawn with respect to at least one of the two school drug testing programs 
addressed by the Court.273 Whether other panvasive actions discussed in Part 
I would have survived a hard look is difficult to know, since the courts, 
operating under the special needs rubric, have generally not demanded the 
“relevant data” required under the doctrine. In general, however, judicial 
pressure enforcing the hard look requirement should have the salutary effect 
of moving police toward data- and evidence-based practices rather than 
programs that rely on unsupported intuition.274 
Were a court applying hard look analysis to examine the three programs 
at issue here, it could justifiably ask for a written explanation of the crime 
problems they are aimed at addressing and how they are meant to do so. New 
York’s Domain Awareness System is touted as a much more efficient way of 
facilitating communication of crime-relevant information to police in real 
time, and also as a means of enhancing police safety by alerting officers to the 
location and history of suspects.275 Fusion center repositories likewise make 
information access and collation more efficient.276 The D.C. roadblock 
 
272 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 683 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“What is absent in the Government’s justifications—notably absent, revealingly absent, 
and as far as I am concerned dispositively absent—is the recitation of even a single instance in which 
any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of 
bribetaking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified 
information, was drug use.”). 
273 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
849 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (indicating that drug use at the school was not a major problem 
at this time); id. at 852-53 (noting that the targets of the program—students who engaged in 
extracurricular activities—were less likely than the general student population to engage in drug 
usage). Lower courts have occasionally been willing to rely on the Fourth Amendment to implement 
the same objective. See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec. of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that drug testing of Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) funds recipients 
constituted an unreasonable search where there was no empirical showing that drug use concerns 
were particularly strong for TANF applicants); Tannahill ex rel. Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding unconstitutional a school district’s drug testing 
policy where empirical evidence showed that drug use had not increased prior to adoption of policy 
and was generally lower than in other schools in the state). 
274 See Lawrence Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 
42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 383-84 (2013) (defining “evidence-based policing” as “the use of best research 
evidence on ‘what works’ as a guide to police decisions” and arguing that police need to move toward 
evidence-based policing not only to improve efficacy but to increase legitimacy). 
275 See Chris Francescani, NYPD Expands Surveillance Net to Fight Crime as Well as Terrorism, 
REUTERS (June 21, 2013, 11:24 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-ny-surveillance-idUSL2
N0EV0D220130621 [https://perma.cc/MHY5-HUUQ] (recounting how the system brings together 
data from multiple technological sources and makes them available to the individual police officer). 
276 See Fusion Center Success Stories, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/
fusion-center-success-stories [https://perma.cc/5DX7-4DZT] (describing the successes of fusion 
centers, which state and local entities have established to improve information sharing and analysis 
regarding a range of threats within their jurisdictions). But see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
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program, probably the most controversial of the three when it was 
implemented, was nonetheless conceived and justified (albeit ex post) as a 
response to an increase in random, drive-by shootings in the Trinidad area of 
the District.277 Thus, on the face of it, all three programs appear to have a 
rational basis. But courts would not be remiss in asking for data supporting 
these points. 
Moreover, hard look analysis should not end with abstract assessments of 
program rationales. Just as important is an evaluation of whether the 
program, as implemented, is rationally aimed at achieving its objectives. If, 
for instance, domain awareness and fusion center policies do not specify how 
the information collected will be kept secure, screened for accuracy, and 
accessed, they fail (quoting from Stack’s explanation) “to consider an 
important aspect of the problem.”278 
Agency deployment of its panvasive resources must be rational as well. 
For instance, some applications of domain awareness technology are meant 
to help police focus their presence in “hot spots” that are thought to be 
particularly prone to crime.279 But suppose the police department chooses to 
flood with cops only some of the zones designated as hot, and those spots 
happen to be heavily populated by people of color.280 The D.C. roadblock 
program ended up affecting only the Trinidad area, which consisted primarily 
of residences owned by poor African Americans.281 In such situations, hard 
look review leads to a third inquiry, which can help uncover biased, capricious, 
or pretextual programs. 
 
Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1444 
(2011) (noting that “[y]ears after they were initiated, advocates of fusion centers have failed to give 
more than a cursory account of the benefits they provide”). 
277 See Glod, supra note 245 (quoting the District of Columbia Attorney General as saying that 
the roadblock “was effective” because “[p]eople were coming in, using cars to shoot the place up and 
then escaping in their vehicles”). 
278 Stack, supra note 268, at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
605 (1977) (explaining that “[t]he right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures”). 
279 See How to Identify Hot Spots, NAT’L INST. JUST. (May 25, 2010), http://nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/strategies/hot-spot-policing/pages/identifying.aspx [https://perma.cc/D5CW-V55E] 
(describing the use of Geographic Information Systems “to more accurately pinpoint hot spots to 
confirm trouble areas, identify the specific nature of the activity occurring within the hot spot and 
then develop strategies to respond”). 
280 Cf. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Stops and Stares: Street Stops, Surveillance and Race in the New Policing, 
42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 52-53) (on file with author) (finding 
that, despite the use of data-based policing methods in Boston, black suspects are more likely than 
white suspects to be observed, interrogated, and frisked, controlling for gang membership and prior 
arrest history). 
281 Glod, supra note 245. 
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C. Implementation of the Policy 
Once a rule is promulgated, the APA says nothing about how it should be 
carried out, apparently because implementation is considered a form of 
informal adjudication for which the APA has not developed standards. Here, 
however, the logic of administrative law, consistent with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, dictates that agency actions be performed in a “regularized” 
fashion; as formulated by one commentary, “It is firmly established that an 
agency’s unjustified discriminatory treatment of similarly situated parties 
constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency action.”282 Thus, courts have held 
that, unless the rationale for the rule signals a different result, all potential 
targets of a program should be treated in the same manner.283 
In its inspection, checkpoint, and drug testing cases, the Court has often 
insisted on this evenhanded implementation requirement, citing the Fourth 
Amendment but also referencing, explicitly or implicitly, administrative 
regimes.284 Accordingly, checkpoints, drug testing programs, inspection 
plans, data collection systems, and other panvasive actions must be 
implemented in a way that minimizes or eliminates discretion through either 
universal or random application of the program to those intended to be 
affected by it. Allowing police on the beat to decide who has “legitimate” 
business within a neighborhood, as occurred in the D.C. roadblock 
program,285 would violate this precept, as would the drug testing policy 
invalidated in Ferguson, which did not apply to all pregnant women but only 
those who had no, late, or incomplete prenatal care, “[p]reterm labor ‘of no 
obvious cause,’” or “[p]reviously known drug or alcohol abuse.”286 Application 
of these types of criteria changes a panvasive search and seizure into a 
suspicion-based one, where traditional normal Fourth Amendment doctrine 
 
282 Joseph T. Small, Jr. & Robert A. Burgoyne, Criminal Prosecutions Initiated by Administrative 
Agencies: the FDA, the Accardi Doctrine and the Requirement of Consistent Agency Treatment, 78 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 87, 103-04 (1987). 
283 See, e.g., Green Country Mobilephone, Inc. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 235, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“We 
reverse the Commission not because the strict rule it applied is inherently invalid, but rather because 
the Commission has invoked the rule inconsistently. We find that the Commission has not treated 
similar cases similarly.”); Crestline Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1982) 
(noting that the NLRB “cannot treat similar situations in dissimilar ways” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Burinskas v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 822, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1966))); Contractors Transp. 
Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976) (explaining that “[p]atently inconsistent 
application of agency standards to similar situations lacks rationality” and is prohibited under the 
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard); Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 517 F.2d 
761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975) (“[An administrative agency] has a duty to define and apply its policies in a 
minimally responsible and evenhanded way.”). 
284 See supra Part I. 
285 See Mills v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 54 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d, 571 F.3d 1304 
(D.C. Cir. 2009). 
286 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71 n.4 (2001). 
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should govern. The inspection program in Burger might have flunked for this 
reason as well: the program was apparently implemented in a highly 
scattershot manner.287 
The evenhandedness requirement goes well beyond ensuring that a 
particular program is carried out in a nondiscriminatory fashion, however. 
Agencies must also ensure that the program, as defined, does not irrationally 
fixate on a particular area or group; to use Stack’s formulation, “the factual 
findings and expected effects of the regulation” must be related “to the 
purposes or goals the agency must consider.”288 In effect, this aspect of hard 
look analysis mimics disparate treatment doctrine,289 but without requiring 
the usual predicate of race or religion. If it turns out that police cannot point 
to solid evidence that the areas or groups subject to domain awareness, 
records collection, or roadblocks are prone to more crime, the administrative 
policy begins to look irrational.290 To avoid the potential for rejection under 
the hard look standard, the ex ante differences in crime rates in these various 
scenarios should be noticeable. Otherwise, the agency should apply the 
program across the board to all similarly situated zones, groups, or 
neighborhoods, or do so randomly.291 
In short, hard look doctrine requires that, when carrying out panvasive 
searches and seizures, police agencies provide a rationale for any distinctions 
they make between places or groups of people. This requirement would redress 
a problem that special needs jurisprudence—which evaluates panvasive actions 
atomistically—leaves completely unregulated. Most importantly, it would 
 
287 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 723 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Neither the 
statute, nor any regulations, nor any regulatory body, provides limits or guidance on the selection of 
vehicle dismantlers for inspection. . . . I conclude that ‘the frequency and purpose of the inspections 
[are left] to the unchecked discretion of Government officers.’”). 
288 Stack, supra note 268, at 378. 
289 Disparate treatment occurs when “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably 
than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). 
290 Some courts confronting the placement of checkpoints have been willing to use the Fourth 
Amendment to achieve this goal. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 727 N.Y.S.2d 881, 881 (App. Div. 2001) 
(stating that “the People were obligated, inter alia, to demonstrate the gravity of the public concern 
that would be served by the roadblock” and finding that the State did not meet its burden because, 
“although the People’s witnesses testified that the relevant locality suffered from an increase in 
various crimes, they offered only generalized assertions to support this claim”); see also State v. 
Parms, 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988) (holding a sobriety checkpoint unconstitutional because there was 
“no evidence of [a] basis for the site selection”); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1985) 
(upholding a sobriety checkpoint plan developed after extensive research into locations within the 
city where there had been DUI arrests and alcohol-related accidents). 
291 See Harcourt & Meares, supra note 6, at 816 (“[R]andomized stops at suspicion-sufficient 
checkpoints should be the focal point of Fourth Amendment reasonableness: randomized 
engagement of citizens offers a better constitutional model for controlling the exercise of police 
power against individuals.”). 
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recognize that policing is redistributive.292 Police do not execute searches and 
seizures in a vacuum; they choose where, when, and how they will deploy 
their resources and, as a result, affect some localities and types of people more 
than others. Today, these choices occur with little or no oversight. The result, 
some allege, is that some communities unfairly bear the brunt of police 
activity.293 Courts should have the authority to make sure that is not the case. 
The hard look doctrine applies only to agency actions, not legislation. But 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the evenhanded implementation 
requirement should apply even when the panvasive policy is dictated by 
statute rather than agency policy. For instance, the registry inspection scheme 
in Patel was explicitly authorized by a legislature,294 an entity that need not 
explain itself in the way an agency must. Nonetheless, the statute was 
unconstitutional because, the Supreme Court implied, it permitted 
nonconsensual searches of a hotel registry on the whim of the police;295 in 
practice, the law permitted police to ignore some hotels entirely but choose 
to search others every day. Because the statute set out no neutral inspection 
plan, police searches under it resembled a suspicion-based search without the 
requisite suspicion. 
D. Legislative Authorization and Oversight 
This latter point leads to a final important attribute of administrative law. 
A predicate to administrative rulemaking is that legislation authorizes the 
agency action about which rules are made.296 Sometimes, as in Patel, the 
legislation directly mandates the action. Usually, however, the statute sets out 
a general directive that the agency must implement more precisely through 
its own policies. If an agency generates a rule, it must be consistent with its 
statutory delegation.297 Any agency rule that is ultra vires is void. 
 
292 See Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1173 
(2012) (“[C]ourts and scholars should conceptualize arrests, and proactive policing more generally, 
as a distributive good.”); see also Miller, supra note 253, at 525 (“[P]olicing presents (in addition to 
the usual procedural and corrective issues) a problem of distributive justice. The distributive issue 
addresses the differential imposition of the benefits and burdens of policing across different 
communities and localities.”). 
293 See Sekhon, supra note 292, at 1211 (“In proactive policing, police departments have 
considerable discretion to ration arrests as they see fit. These departmental choices generate winners 
and losers, with significant distributive consequences.”). 
294 See L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.49(2)–(4) (2015). 
295 See City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2456 (2015) (holding that the statute “is 
also constitutionally deficient . . . because it fails sufficiently to constrain police officers’ discretion 
as to which hotels to search and under what circumstances”). 
296 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 172, § 4.4, at 171 (“The statute is the source of agency authority 
as well as of its limits. If an agency act is within the statutory limits (or vires), its action is valid; if 
it is outside them (or ultra vires), it is invalid.”). 
297 Id. § 4.4, at 172. 
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This principle could have significant implications for panvasive searches 
and seizures because a large number of such programs are not explicitly 
authorized by legislation. For instance, drug testing programs like the one in 
Skinner, sobriety checkpoints like those in Sitz, and surveillance systems like 
New York’s Domain Awareness System are, at best, grounded on omnibus 
statutory delegations of law enforcement powers.298 Similarly, fusion centers 
often operate without any explicit statutory authority;299 thus there is no 
legislative directive as to the types of information they can collect, the length of 
time they may maintain it, or the types of wrongdoing they can attempt to detect 
with the information collected. In an administrative paradigm, courts might well 
conclude that a more specific legislative mandate is required when government 
action is so significant in scope and involves such sensitive information.300 
Of course, at the federal level, the Supreme Court has indicated that, at 
most, legislation need only set out a vague “intelligible principle” to guide 
agencies.301 But if the only relevant legislative pronouncement is “to enforce 
 
298 The drug testing policy in Skinner was promulgated under the Federal Railroad Safety Act 
of 1970, which simply states that the Secretary of Transportation is to “prescribe, as necessary, 
appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety.” Skinner v. Ry. 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1976)). The sobriety 
checkpoint in Sitz was triggered by a gubernatorial request over legislative opposition. Sitz v. Dep’t 
of State Police, 429 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Mich. Dep’t of State Police 
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). The New York City Domain Awareness System was based on the 
authority of chapter 18, section 435(a) of the New York City Charter, which states that police shall 
“preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and 
insurrections, disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages . . . ; protect the rights of persons and 
property, guard the public health, [and] preserve order[;] . . . regulate, direct, control and restrict the 
movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic for the facilitation of traffic and the convenience of the 
public as well as the proper protection of human life and health . . . ; inspect and observe all places of 
public amusement [and] all places of business . . . [; and] enforce and prevent the violation of all laws 
and ordinances in force in the city; and for these purposes to arrest all persons guilty of violating any 
law or ordinance for the suppression or punishment of crimes or offenses.” N.Y.C. CHARTER ch. 18, 
§ 435(a) (2004). 
299 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 243, at 6 (stating that fusion centers “derive 
their authority from general statutes creating state police agencies or memoranda of understanding 
among partner agencies”); see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 276, at 1453-55 (discussing 
“confusing lines of authority” with respect to fusion centers). 
300 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1844 (“As compared with the regulation 
of almost any other aspect of society that fundamentally affects the rights and liberties of the people, 
rules adopted by democratic bodies to govern policing tend to be few and far between.”). 
301 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). The Court 
has struck down only two statutes on nondelegation grounds, “one of which provided literally no 
guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the 
entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring 
‘fair competition.’” Id. at 474. The first statute found to be “unintelligible” required that the agency 
act in the “public interest,” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943), and the 
second ordered the agency to regulate in a “fair and equitable” manner, Yakus v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414, 420, 447 (1944). 
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the criminal law,”302 even that vacuous mandate might not be met. It is also 
worth noting that the nondelegation doctrine—which is the genesis of the 
intelligible principle requirement—is frequently much more robust in the 
states than it is at the federal level.303 Thus, for instance, one state court has 
held that the nondelegation doctrine “requires that the legislature, in delegating 
its authority provide sufficient identification of the following: (1) The persons 
and activities potentially subject to regulation; (2) the harm sought to be 
prevented; and (3) the general means intended to be available to the 
administrator to prevent the identified harm.”304 
As this language suggests, taken seriously the nondelegation doctrine 
would force the relevant legislature to be specific in authorizing panvasive 
actions. The legislating body would have to endorse in a statute the use of 
cameras and license plate recognition systems necessary to carry out the domain 
program, the collection of information from financial and communications 
entities that occurs within fusion centers, and the detentions that occur at 
neighborhood checkpoints aimed at fighting violence;305 likewise with other 
types of panvasive actions, such as sobriety checkpoints, drug testing of school 
children, and DNA testing. Forcing these issues to be debated at the highest 
policy level ensures democratic accountability.306 
Just as importantly, a specific legislative directive identifying the “persons 
or activities” sought to be regulated, the “harm” to be prevented, and the 
“means” of prevention would provide crucial guidance for law enforcement in 
panvasive cases, especially with respect to the first category: persons and 
activities to be affected. If, for instance, the legislature authorizes drug testing 
of school children, the principle of evenhanded application would require 
testing of every child in the jurisdiction or, in the alternative, a random subset 
of that group or a subset of that group that is demonstrably more likely to be 
involved in illegal drug use. The legislative provision would define the group 
 
302 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1844 (noting that “[t]he typical enabling 
statute of a policing agency simply authorizes it to enforce the substantive criminal law—but says little 
or nothing about what enforcement actions police are permitted to take”). 
303 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers 
Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172 (1999) (“In many states, courts impose substantive 
limits on delegation. Legislatures are not allowed to delegate to agencies unless they have articulated 
reviewable standards to guide agency discretion, even where procedural safeguards are in place.”). 
304 Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ill. 1977). 
305 See Eric Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic 
Pedigree, and Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2010) (arguing that 
“delegations lacking intelligible principles are often less deserving of judicial deference because the 
resulting policies lack the political authority that typically underlies the rationale for the deference 
in the first place”). 
306 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1875 (asserting that “democratic review 
[not judicial review] is what is necessary to strike the policy balance that rests at the bottom of 
policing decisions”). 
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to be subjected to the panvasive action, which would force both the legislature 
and the law enforcement agency to consider and be clear about the stakes 
involved and cabin the agency’s discretion. 
A final observation on the legislature’s role has to do with oversight. 
Enforcement of legislative directives has usually been left to the courts and 
the agencies themselves. However, Congress has occasionally created other 
agency-oversight mechanisms. For instance, Congress has required that all 
major agency actions be subject to cost–benefit analysis by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs.307 Other statutes set up legislative 
oversight committees for particular agency actions, such as those involving 
national security surveillance.308 While such oversight is not required as a 
first principle of administrative law, it might be a factor that a reviewing court 
considers in weighing whether a police agency has been sufficiently attentive 
to effectiveness and other policy considerations in establishing a search or 
seizure program.309 
E. Future Directions 
The goal of this Article is to give teeth to the new administrativist 
approach to police regulation. The essential claim is that, given their 
legislative nature, panvasive actions not only should, but must, be governed 
by administrative law principles. These principles would improve democratic 
accountability and counter the usual law enforcement orientation of 
legislative bodies by requiring public input prior to implementation, agency 
rationalization of the program, implementation that is both consistent with 
the stated rationale and evenhandedly carried out, and legislative 
authorization that is sufficiently specific to satisfy a court that a representative 
body considers the program permissible. Finally, these principles apply 
regardless of whether the courts have formally designated a particular type of 
panvasive action a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
For one who is persuaded by these points, a cause for concern is that the 
entire scheme is dependent on the whims of the legislature. Congress and 
state legislatures, lobbied by police-oriented groups, could explicitly exempt 
law enforcement agencies from the APA and the equivalent state 
 
307 See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Who’s on First?: The Role of the Office of Management and Budget 
in Federal Information Policy, 10 J. LEGIS. 95, 115 (1983) (noting that Congress delegated responsibility 
for the Paperwork Reduction Act to OIRA, which gave the office “important management powers”). 
308 See Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 289, 316-25 (2015) (describing the Federal Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board). 
309 Berger, supra note 305, at 52-53 (discussing the importance of oversight and the weight it 
should receive in reviewing delegations to agencies). 
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administrative procedure statutes.310 The question then becomes whether the 
Fourth Amendment or, as Davis argued years ago,311 the Due Process Clause 
would nonetheless require that some version of these principles apply. 
Certainly the notice and rationality requirements outlined here could be seen 
as aspects of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. But further 
elaboration of that point is left for future inquiry, as is the extent to which 
the exclusionary rule, rather than the usual administrative remedy of 
enjoining a flawed program, is appropriate in this setting.312 
Also left for later work is whether these same precepts ought to apply to 
other aspects of police work. This Article has distinguished panvasive and 
suspicion-based actions on the ground that only the former type of policing 
is sufficiently legislative in nature to mandate application of traditional 
administrative law principles. But that distinction may at most exempt from 
administrative purview the decision to stop, arrest, or search a particular 
person. While that decision is akin to an adjudication, the methods police use 
to carry out stops, arrests, and searches are closer to legislative rules. For 
instance, the force used to effect a detention, the protocol for communicating 
with the targets of a search, and the use of body cameras are all issues that 
can easily be dealt with prospectively. Like the panvasive actions discussed in 
this Article, these methodological matters clearly affect the “rights” of citizens. 
The key question is whether they are sufficiently distant from “internal” or 
“interpretive” concerns to be subject to written policies that are developed after 
public input, bolstered by written justifications, and subject to judicial review. 
Ironically, the focal point of Professor Davis’s seminal scholarship—the 
decision about whom to stop, arrest, and search once the requisite cause is 
established—is the type of police work that sits least comfortably with current 
administrative law requirements. The mismatch is compounded by the 
unavailability of an obvious remedy in such situations. The administrative law 
remedy for failure to devise a rule, follow the appropriate rulemaking process, 
 
310 In Florida, for instance, the state APA exempts law enforcement policies and procedures 
which relate to “[t]he collection, management, and dissemination of active criminal intelligence 
information and active criminal investigative information; management of criminal investigations; 
and . . . [s]urveillance techniques, the selection of surveillance personnel, and electronic 
surveillance, including court-ordered and consensual interceptions of communication.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 120.80(6)(a)–(c) (2016). 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75. 
312 On the exclusionary rule issue, my tentative preference is to use exclusion as a deterrent to 
pretextual use of panvasive actions, but otherwise to rely on equitable remedies. See Slobogin, supra 
note 3, at 142-43. Thus, drugs found during a license checkpoint stop would be inadmissible even if 
the checkpoint is legitimate, but drugs found during a narcotics checkpoint would not be, whether 
or not the checkpoint is valid as a matter of administrative law. As the Supreme Court said in United 
States v. Caceres, “we cannot ignore the possibility that a rigid application of an exclusionary rule to 
every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional 
standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures.” 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979). 
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or implement a rule evenhandedly is to enjoin the administrative action.313 
That remedy works when the challenge is to a policy authorizing a panvasive 
action; once chastised by a court, the police agency must simply go back to 
the drawing board. But when the challenge is to a failure to follow a selective 
enforcement rule, the analogous remedy would be dismissal of charges, which 
will strike most as overkill, especially when the police action is in fact based 
on probable cause or meets other Fourth Amendment requirements.314 None 
of this means that selective enforcement decisions would not benefit from 
development of administrative rules as well. But even if regulation of that part 
of police work is left to the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, 
and the substantive criminal law, a significant amount of police conduct beyond 
panvasive actions might still be subject to administrative law principles. 
CONCLUSION 
Searches and seizures of groups have proven to be a major challenge for 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The traditional requirement of 
individualized suspicion, if rigorously applied, would spell the end of all 
panvasive searches and seizures, even those that most would agree are 
effective and minimally intrusive. But foregoing all regulation of panvasive 
actions creates a huge potential for abuse, akin to that associated with the 
dreaded general warrant, especially as modern policing increasingly moves in 
the direction of mass surveillance and other technologically driven programs 
such as DNA testing. The Supreme Court’s attempt to mediate this tension 
through its special needs doctrine is incoherent and overly deferential. The 
strict scrutiny alternative proposed by many commentators errs too far in the 
other direction, and sends courts into thickets best reserved for the legislative 
and administrative processes. 
This Article has argued that, given the administrative nature of panvasive 
searches and seizures, the courts should turn to administrative law in this 
setting. Both Supreme Court precedent and the rule-like structure of 
panvasive actions support such an approach. A regulatory regime based on 
administrative law principles would hold law enforcement agencies more 
accountable to legislatures, the public, and the courts than does the Court’s 
special needs doctrine, but would avoid subjecting departmental decisions to 
detailed second-guessing by the judiciary. In short, police agencies should be 
 
313 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (authorizing reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”); see also Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (involving a suit to enjoin the operation of a sobriety checkpoint that would 
result in the arrest of drivers found to be drunk). 
314 See Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 140, at 1904-05 (recognizing this problem). 
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treated like other agencies. While still granted significant deference, police 
agencies, like other agencies, would be required to seek public input before 
enacting search and seizure programs, provide reasons for their decisions, act 
consistently with those reasons, and distribute policing power evenly within 
the scope of legislative mandates. That combination of restrictions, enforced 
by the courts, would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s central 
goal—embodied in its reasonableness requirement—of limiting government 
discretion, without imposing impossible or difficult-to-decipher burdens on 
either the executive or judicial branches. 
